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In this dissertation, I draw on the work of Martin Heidegger to provide a critical account 
of the way our understanding of the world is shaped by modern conceptions of reason. I 
claim that our current ways of thinking about ourselves and the world of our everyday 
lives are already framed by a particular form of reason that Heidegger identifies as 
sufficient ‘scientific’ reasoning. This type of reasoning limits our understanding of the 
world by framing it a priori within the confines of the scientific conception of ‘nature’. 
What this entails, more specifically, is an account of the world and human existence that 
is reduced to the level of things. I argue that this scientific conception is a historically 
situated interpretation, which following Heidegger, I suggest is based on our tendency 
to forget the way we primarily understand and interpret the things around us. I begin by 
addressing the question of Being, which I frame in terms of the meaningful presence of 
things. Following this, I present Heidegger’s account of the meaningful surrounding 
world, which we encounter through our projects. Finally, I close by discussing some of 
the specific ways that scientific reasoning has covered over this meaningful surrounding 
world. My aim is to show how the world around us is primarily meaningful, and that 
Heidegger’s analyses of sufficient reason and modern science are an extension of his 
earlier critique of the metaphysical divide between subject and object, whereby human 
beings are reduced to the thinking thing—res cogitans. Overall, I argue that the 
scientific account of the ‘natural world’ is one interpretation among others, and by no 
means the final or ultimate interpretation of that which is. Rather, we must challenge 
ourselves to new ways of thinking in order to see that the world ‘is’ primarily the place 
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My aim in the following dissertation will be to show the historical basis and limitations 
of modern scientific and sufficient reasoning, which I argue occlude other ways of 
understanding the world we live in.1 Following Heidegger, I claim that these forms of 
reasoning rest on a common metaphysical ground, which I explain through René 
Descartes’ distinction between res extensa and res cogitans. I contend that the 
dominance of this type of reasoning covers over the conception of world presented in 
Being and Time (2010),2 wherein Heidegger conceives of the world as the broader 
meaningful horizon that shapes our human understanding. Specifically, the modern 
scientific notion of the ‘natural world’ reduces the world of our living to a collection of 
singular objects. This is problematic because the objects we account for on the basis of 
scientific reason are ultimately devoid of human meaning. By contrast, Heidegger offers 
a way to rethink the world as the meaningful place of human concern. 
As I explain further in §6, Heidegger follows the method of hermeneutic 
phenomenology, the emphasis of which is on the way phenomena are understood and 
interpreted by historical human beings. Therefore, since I am drawing mainly from 
Heidegger’s work and Heideggerian scholarship, this method will be reflected in the 
discussion I present here. I consider this hermeneutic approach to phenomena necessary 
against the backdrop of modern scientific reasoning, which leads us to overlook the 
history of human thought. My intention will be to present a different way of thinking 
about the world around us, one that is able to recognise how things are disclosed to us 
meaningfully, in regard to our own historical situation. 
                                                 
1 I use the terms ‘the world’, ‘surrounding world’ and ‘the world around us’ interchangeably to refer to 
this meaningful human world, or ‘Umwelt’ for Heidegger (cf. §12). Any references to the scientific 
conception of the world will be qualified by phrases like ‘the natural world’ or ‘the scientific conception 
of’. 
2 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time [Sein und Zeit]. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. SUNY Series in 
Contemporary Continental Philosophy, edited by Dennis J. Schmidt. Albany, US-NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2010 [1927]. 
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In order to substantiate my thesis that scientific reasoning is a historically constituted 
interpretation of our surrounding world, and to introduce the reader to some of the 
major concerns of Heidegger’s thought, in chapter one, I begin with a brief overview of 
Heidegger’s ontological project as developed in Being and Time. My aim is to outline 
the conception of meaning that modern scientific rationality cannot account for. 
Specifically, I discuss the question of Being [Sein], which, following work by Thomas 
Sheehan, I argue is a question about the meaningful presence of things.3 I claim that any 
response to questions about our meaningful surroundings will change depending on the 
historical conditions of our own finite lives, so that such questions are best approached 
in terms of hermeneutic phenomenology. To repeat, this method involves a focus on the 
way meaningful phenomena are revealed and concealed to human beings in terms of the 
historical and factical circumstances of human life. Moreover, it is this hermeneutic 
method of inquiry that I oppose to modern scientific inquiry in the third chapter.  
In the second chapter, I expand on Heidegger’s conception of ‘the world’ as he explains 
it through the method of hermeneutic phenomenology. Following Heidegger, my 
intention in this chapter will be to put forward the conception of the meaningful world 
that I contend is primary, and presupposed by our modern scientific notions of reason. 
In doing so, I compare Heidegger’s conception of the structure of human existence 
(Dasein) and ‘being-in-the-world’ [‘In-der-Welt-sein’] with the Cartesian divide 
between res extensa and res cogitans, a divide that serves as the metaphysical ground of 
modern science. In contrast to the Cartesian account, I argue that the world is not an 
object or collection of objects, but the historically constituted, meaningful horizon that 
                                                 
3 Sheehan, Thomas. Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift. New Heidegger Research, edited by 
Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. London, UK; Lanham, US-MD; Boulder, US-NY; Toronto, CA: 
Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd., 2015. 
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is always already open to Dasein. In other words, the world ‘is’ the broader, meaningful 
context of everyday human life.  
In the final chapter, I draw on some of Heidegger’s later critiques of modern scientific 
reasoning, which I argue extend the critique of Cartesianism that he presents in Being 
and Time. I point out how modern science leads us to overlook our meaningful 
engagement with the things we use in the context of our surrounding world by limiting 
our understanding of the world in advance. On the modern scientific account, our 
surroundings are reduced to an ordered arrangement of fixed objects, objects that are re-
presented to our consciousness, but which are divorced from our own meaningful 
engagement with things. Such an understanding, I claim, is an appropriation of 
Cartesian metaphysics. As I show, both Cartesian metaphysics and scientific inquiry 
take as their point of departure mathematical principles that are considered to be 
‘known’ a priori.  
Yet, far from being a priori, such metaphysical descriptions are ultimately human 
interpretations of the surrounding world, interpretations that are always historical. While 
we formulate certain metaphysical concepts in our attempts to provide reasons or 
grounds for the Being of things, (i.e., the meaningful presence of things), Being cannot 
be reduced to reason or grounds, but is ‘groundless’ to the extent that there is nothing 
‘to’ Being other than human meaning. Only human beings interpret their surroundings 
meaningfully, in the context of the concerns that make up everyday life. The initial task 
of any inquiry into the world around us is to address the question of Being, since 
worldly things ‘are’ and must be before we can render them as objects for rational–
scientific investigation. Therefore, following Heidegger, I argue that if we overlook the 
question of how beings come to be the beings they ‘are’, we will always overlook our 
most primary relation to the world, which is always already meaningful. Taken together, 
10 
I will show that sufficient ‘scientific’ reasoning is a historical interpretation that is 
always derived from this meaningful world-horizon. 
 
11 
Chapter 1: Being 
We see the light but see not whence it comes.4 
§1 Introduction 
To support my claim that scientific rationality is a historically grounded interpretation 
that limits our thinking about the world around us, in this first chapter, I outline 
Heidegger’s posing of the question of Being. My intention here is to present the notion 
of meaning that is covered over by modern conceptions of reason. The study of Being is 
ontology,5 and through fundamental ontology, Heidegger aims to uncover the conditions 
for the possibility of the study of Being.6 In the following, I suggest that Heidegger’s 
concern with ontological questions is a consistent theme throughout his thinking. 
Moreover, I approach the question of Being as a question about the significance or 
meaningfulness of our surrounding world. Sheehan lends support for this approach in 
his call for a paradigm shift in Heideggerian research. At the crux of Sheehan’s 
argument is the claim that ‘Being’ should always be taken to refer to the “meaningful 
presence of things”, intelligible only to human beings in a particular epoch.7 The only 
‘escape’ from meaning, according to Sheehan, is death.8 Likewise, Taylor Carman 
claims that Being refers to the intelligibility of entities that we deal with, or more 
specifically, the condition for the intelligibility of such entities.9 As I explain further, 
entities are intelligible to us insofar as we immediately understand them in relation to 
our own lives. Briefly, we can say that to ask after the Being of beings is to ask after 
                                                 
4 T.S. Eliot, “Choruses from ‘the Rock’.” In Collected Poems 1909–1962 (1963), p. 170. 
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (2010), §7, p. 35 [37]. See also, Heidegger, Ontology—the 
Hermeneutics of Facticity (1999), §1, pp. 1–3. 
6 BT, §3, p. 10 [11]. See also, “[fundamental ontology aims] to expose the horizon for the most primordial 
interpretation of [B]eing.” (BT, §5, p. 17 [17]). 
7 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (2015), p. 112. 
8 “By our very nature we are both the demand for and the reason for intelligibility, for a meaningfulness 
that determines us and yet has no reality apart from us. And there is no way out but death. In fact, the 
whole process of making sense is mortal” (Ibid., p. 113). 
9 Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time 
(2003), p. 15. 
12 
that which allows human beings to encounter things as the things they are at a specific 
period of time.10  
As I will discuss throughout, the issue for Heidegger is that the tradition of Western 
metaphysics—inaugurated by the Ancient Greeks, transformed by the scholastics and 
then overturned by Descartes in the seventeenth century—has limited our understanding 
of the world around us to an arrangement of objects that are supposedly ‘timeless’ and 
unchanging (cf. §3). This is problematic insofar as we forget that our meaningful 
engagement with worldly things does not take the form of our merely looking at them as 
fixed objects. Rather, for the most part, we use things in order to undertake certain 
projects [Entwurf], projects which are future-orientated. To limit the world around us to 
a collection of fixed objects is particularly pernicious when we consider that human 
life—and the meaningful engagement with things entailed by it—is always structured 
by time. As I discuss below, human existence is not like some timeless or static object, 
but is always finite and factical.  
Therefore, in contrast to the static objects of modern metaphysics, Heidegger argues that 
fundamental ontology must take finite human existence as its point of departure, leading 
him to reformulate phenomenology as hermeneutic11 phenomenology. He develops this 
method in order to account for the way our meaningful comportment toward things is 
shaped by the historical circumstances of our lives. Overall, in this chapter, I will lay 
down the groundwork necessary to illustrate the limitations of scientific rationality in 
regard to the meaningfulness of our surrounding world, which I address in chapter three. 
Here, I will show that the Being of things is always related to human meaning. 
                                                 
10 N.B. This view is disputed by the ‘Object Orientated Ontology’ of Graham Harman, who asserts that it 
is entirely possible to maintain a Heideggerian ontology that takes nonhuman beings as its point of 
departure. See, Graham Harman, “An Outline of Object-Oriented Philosophy,” Science Progress 96, no. 2 
(2013). 
11 N.B. Heidegger approaches hermeneutics differently over the course of his writing. For a discussion of 
these changes, see Ingo Farin, “Heidegger: Transformation of Hermeneutics.” In The Routledge 
Companion to Hermeneutics, ed. Jeff Malpas and Hans-Helmuth Gander (2015), pp. 107–126. 
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§2 The Question of Being 
Heidegger lays down the project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time,12 which is 
widely considered his magnum opus.13 Fundamental ontology is influenced by (yet 
radically different to) the ‘transcendental’ or ‘reflective’ phenomenology of Edmund 
Husserl,14 Neo-Kantianism,15 the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard,16 and work done by 
figures like Wilhelm Dilthey, Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg,17 and Georg 
Simmel.18 Heidegger’s work is distinguished from these other ways of thinking insofar 
as the question of Being is at the front and centre of his philosophy, a question 
Heidegger claims has been ‘forgotten’ over the course of history, and which he insists 
we must return to.19 Vincent Vycinas, Otto Pöggeler and Hans-Georg Gadamer (among 
others) suggest that the problem of Being characterises Heidegger’s entire oeuvre, and 
that all the problems Heidegger identifies are problems to do with the question of 
Being.20 To be sure, any critical engagement with Heidegger’s work will ultimately 
come up against the ‘Being question’, which, to repeat, I argue is a question about the 
meaningful context of our surrounding world. 
In the opening pages of BT, Heidegger tentatively suggests that we can take ‘Being’ to 
refer to “that which determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings have 
                                                 
12 From now on referred to as BT 
13 See, for example, Sheehan, 2015, p. 123, Harman, 2007, p. 127.  
14 N.B. While I acknowledge the profound influence of Husserl on Heidegger’s thought, due to the scope 
of this dissertation I am only able to mention this influence in passing. For more, see Martin Heidegger, 
“My Way to Phenomenology.” In On Time and Being (1972). See also, Gadamer: “[Heidegger] built on 
research in intentionality carried out by the phenomenology of Husserl” (2004, p. 235). Von Herrmann, 
2013, Biemel, 1977, pp. 5–7.  
15 See, Peter Eli Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos (2010). See also, Safranski, 
1998, pp. 31–39; Gadamer, 1994, pp. 49–59; Mehta, 1976, p. 40; Crowell, 2001, pp. 76–92.   
16 Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, pp. 83; 117–118; 152; 173–175. See also, 
Heidegger, BT, §40, p. 184 [190] n. 4; §45, p. 225 [235] n. 6; §68, p. 323 [338] n. 3. 
17 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways (1994), pp. 53–54. See also, Pöggeler, 1998, p. 73.  
18 Gadamer, Truth and Method, n. 138, p. 264. 
19 Heidegger, BT, §1, p. 1 [2]; §6, p. 21 [21]. See also, Heidegger, OHF, §1, pp. 1–3. 
20 Vincent Vycinas, Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1961), p. 3. 
See also, Pöggeler, 1998, Gadamer, 1994, p. 46.  
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always been understood no matter how they are discussed”.21 Following this claim, he 
immediately clarifies that “[t]he [B]eing of being ‘is’ itself not a being”.22 As William 
Richardson explains, ‘Being’ names that which renders possible all that ‘is’.23 One 
could say that Being ‘illuminates’ particular beings as something we recognise as 
meaningfully related to the projects of our everyday lives. Yet, “just as light cannot be 
perceived without the things it illuminates,”24 we have no ‘access’ to Being, only to 
particular beings. Being ‘is not’ a particular being, “Being is the transcendens pure and 
simple”.25 That is, Being ‘transcends’ every possible and actual conception of a being. 
Being ‘transcends’ particular beings insofar as human beings understand what Being 
illuminates in terms of a broader meaningful context, which goes beyond particular 
beings and makes sense to us in terms of our own past and present circumstances, as 
well as the future we expect for ourselves. In the next chapter, I identify this meaningful 
context as our surrounding world. Here, I wish only to indicate that our own relation to 
beings is always marked by temporality [Zeitlichkeit], and, by extension, historicity (i.e. 
our being historical).26 Specifically, our interpretation of the way Being discloses 
particular beings will always change depending on our own finite situation.27 Hence, we 
cannot label ‘Being’ with any kind of ‘comprehensive’ or timeless definition.28 As I 
                                                 
21 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (2010), §2, p. 5 [6]. 
22 Ibid. 
23 William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (1974), p. 4. 
24 Vycinas, Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, p. 5. 
25 Heidegger, BT, §7, p. 36 [38]. 
26 In The Concept of Time, Heidegger claims “Historicity signifies the historical being [Geschichtlichsein] 
of that which exists as history.” (2011, p. 1, [3]). Further, in BT: “…temporality is at the same time the 
condition of the possibility of historicity as a temporal mode of being of Dasein itself…” (BT, §6, p. 19 
[20]). See also, The Concept of Time, pp. 80–91 [94–95]; BT, §45, pp. 224–225 [234–235]. 
27 N.B. In the chapters that follow, we will see how this ‘finite situation’ is not strictly limited to the 
temporal, and also encompasses the meaningful place (not space) of human life. See Jeff Malpas: “[T]he 
hermeneutic focus on human finitude, and so on knowledge and understanding as belonging essentially to 
finite existence, and only to finite existence, may seem to involve no appeal to notions of situation or 
place in the first instance, and yet these notions are surely implicit, being brought directly into view as 
soon as any close attention is brought to bear on the idea of finitude as such.” “Place and Situation.” In 
The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics, ed. Jeff Malpas and Hans-Helmuth Gander (2015), p. 355. 
28 “Because being is in each instance comprehensible only in regard to time, the answer to the question of 
being cannot lie in an isolated and blind proposition.”  (BT, §5, p.18 [19]). 
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explain below, time is the total horizon of Being,29 and the way we relate to the Being 
of things is always already framed by the historical situation in which we find ourselves. 
Therefore, we must avoid metaphysical (rational, empirical) conceptions which equate 
‘Being’ with the objectively present ahistorical characteristics of particular beings. 
§3 Temporality, Historicity and Facticity 
According to Heidegger, traditional metaphysical accounts of Being overlook the 
temporal structure of our meaningful engagement with things in favour of what is static 
and unchanging. In Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity (1991),30 he broadly 
defines modern metaphysics as “a theory of objects”.31 As he repeatedly stresses, 
modern metaphysics always conceives of the thing as standing over and against the 
human subject, as an object that is unchanging and ‘frozen’ outside of time. 
Metaphysics, then, is always the metaphysics of objective presence.32 In BT Heidegger 
explicitly attempts to overcome this prejudice via his ‘destruction’ [Destruktion] of the 
philosophical tradition.33 Walter Biemel notes that this ‘destruction’ is intended to make 
the “petrified history of ontology” transparent to us, so that we may come to know the 
manner in which such a history has framed our understanding.34 For Heidegger, we 
must resist the impulse to render Being in terms of any traditional metaphysical 
distinctions or logical propositions, which conflate ‘Being’ with the timeless presence of 
particular beings, since that which Being illuminates is never static or timeless. Contra 
metaphysics, we never encounter beings as fixed objects that we observe as standing 
                                                 
29 Ibid., §5,  p.17 [17]. See also, Carman, 2003, p. 13, Pöggeler, 1998, p. 82, Richardson, 1974, pp. 85–90, 
Sheehan, 2015, pp. 95–105, Vycinas, 1961, p. 3, Marx, 1971, p. 190. 
30 From now on referred to as OHF. 
31 Heidegger, OHF, §1, p.1. 
32 See Heidegger in Introduction to Metaphysics: “To be sure, within the purview of metaphysics…one 
can regard the question about Being as such merely as a mechanical repetition of the question about 
beings as such.” (2014, p. 20 [14]). See also, Richardson: “Metaphysics talks about Being…only in the 
sense of the total ensemble of Beings.” (1974, p. 7); Gadamer, 1994, p. 48; Hart, 2011, p. 45. 
33 BT, §6, pp. 19–25 [19–27]. See also, Marx, 1971, pp. 85–87; 107. 
34 Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, p. 32. 
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over and against us. Rather, beings only make sense to us in terms of the broader 
meaningful context of our projects.  
One of Heidegger’s key claims is that we never find ourselves opposed to singular, 
unchanging objects that we first ‘perceive’ and then attribute meaning to. Instead, things 
are immediately meaningfully related to the whole of our lives. In BT he points out that 
“‘[i]nitially’ we never hear noises and complexes of sound, but the creaking wagon, the 
motorcycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, 
the crackling fire”.35 In other words, we never hear ‘sound’ as such; ‘sound’ is a 
theoretical concept that subsumes all particular instances of our hearing something as 
something we already understand. We could never conceive of ‘sound’ and go on to 
establish fields like acoustics or audiology if we did not initially find ourselves in a 
context that is immediately meaningful to us.  
As Sheehan observes, our comportment toward things does not take the form of a 
response to isolated sense-data; we always encounter meaningful things before we are 
even able to consider them.36 The fact that things already are constitutes the great 
‘wonder’ that marks the beginning of philosophy, as Plato and Aristotle claimed.37 Yet, 
when we ask about things—or even when we start to think about them—we tend to take 
this wonder for granted, we neglect our primary involvement with meaningful things 
and consider them as singular objects, thereby removing them from the context of ‘total 
meaningfulness’.38 To overlook this meaningful context is to overlook the fundamental 
way that we understand our surroundings, an understanding that is always shaped by the 
continual passing of our own lives, as well as the historical situation that we find 
                                                 
35 Heidegger, BT, §34, p. 158 [164]. 
36 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, p. 117. 
37 In the Theaetetus, Plato claims: “This wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else.” 
(155d3). See also, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 982b13-23; 983a10-20, Hart, 2011, p. 46, Sheehan, 2015, p. 
112. 
38 To use William Richardson’s term. See Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 
p. 56. 
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ourselves in. For Heidegger, the way human beings meaningfully relate to the things 
around them is not reducible to the static presence or appearance of singular things to 
sensory perception; this is already a historically constituted way of thinking.  
While I will return to this particular way of thinking, for now it is suffice to say that, for 
Heidegger, human beings cannot be reduced to the level of static objects. Rather, human 
life is always structured by time: one is born, one lives awhile and then, finally, one 
dies. For this reason, human life is characterised by finitude, as well as facticity 
[faktizität].39 As I will discuss in the next chapter (cf. §9), facticity plays a crucial role 
in our meaningful comportment toward worldly things. Briefly, we can take ‘facticity’ 
to refer to the being of our own existence.40 According to Heidegger we are always 
‘awake to’41 or aware of our own Being, though not in the sense of our ‘having’ or 
‘knowing’ this Being, which is not a being among other beings that can be ‘had’ or 
‘known’. Rather, facticity refers to how we are always ‘there’ for ourselves to the extent 
that our own Being is an issue for us.42  
This awareness of our own Being is illustrated by the way we are always interpreting 
ourselves in terms of who we are.43 For example, it is due to my facticity that I already 
understand myself as an Australian male, living in the 21st century. Facticity underpins 
all our actions in the world, which always make sense to us because we already 
understand the things we encounter and use in terms of their being something. Things 
can only be the things they are within the context of the projects we undertake, and 
these projects shape our understanding of who we are, an understanding that is itself 
                                                 
39 N.B. I use the terms ‘facticity’ and ‘factic’ interchangeably. 
40 Heidegger, OHF, p. 5. 
41 Ibid., p. 5; §3, pp. 12–15. 
42 Ibid., p. 5. 
43 Ibid., §3, p. 14. 
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always already shaped by the particular historical and cultural circumstances we are 
born into. 
Thus, to overlook temporality is especially problematic when it comes to human 
existence, which is always structured by time. For Theodore Kisiel, Heidegger takes up 
the concept of facticity to account for the “particular while” or awhileness 
[“Jeweiligkeit”] that characterises each of our own lives.44 In OHF, Heidegger explicitly 
identifies temporality as “fundamental” to facticity.45 Facticity, however, is not 
something present that is to be found ‘out there’ in the external world, but is rather the 
very basis of our ability to engage with things at all. Through facticity, our relation to 
things always takes on a sense of ‘mineness’ to the extent that we are only able to 
interpret the Being of things in terms of our own lived historical situation.46 Due to our 
facticity, we already stand in some ‘relation’ to Being, which, for Heidegger, means 
that there is always a ‘fore-structure’ [‘Vor-Struktur’] that shapes our understanding of 
Being in advance.47 As Vycinas observes, all our actions are, so to speak, a response to 
Being.48 As I discuss in §6, we only approach the meaning of Being hermeneutically, 
i.e., in terms of interpretation. 
§4 Being and Meaningfulness 
As I have stressed, any response to the question of Being will always be limited by our 
own finite understanding of the things we encounter and use meaningfully each day. 
Thus, one way to frame the problem of Being is in terms of the problem of meaning. 
                                                 
44 Theodore J. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1995), p. 274. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Heidegger, OHF, §2, p. 5. See also, Gadamer: “Everything that is experienced by oneself, and part of 
its meaning is that it belongs to the unity of the self and thus contains an unmistakable and irreplaceable 
relation to the whole of this one life” (2004, p.48). 
47 BT, §32, pp. 144–149 [148–153]. See also, Heidegger, 1999, §3, p. 13; §16, pp. 61–62. 
48 Vycinas, Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, p. 8. See also, 
Heidegger in Identity and Difference: “Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he 
is only this. This ‘only’ does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess.” (1969, p. 31). 
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That is, how it is that things come to be understood and interpreted as the things they 
‘are’. Heidegger explicitly puts forward this formulation of the problem of Being in a 
1935 lecture course,49 wherein he aligns the question of Being with the question ‘what 
is a thing?’ Once again, he points out that the emphasis of this question is not on this or 
that species of thing, but on what it means to be a thing—i.e., the ‘thingness’ of the 
thing. The issue is that we cannot say the thingness of the thing is itself a thing, since 
this does not tell us anything about ‘thingness’ at all.50 While asking after the 
‘thingness’ of the thing might appear like an odd question to our modern way of 
thinking, this formulation is helpful for bringing the question of Being in closer 
proximity to the question of meaning, and by extension, to our everyday lives.  
We can take ‘meaning’ in this context to refer to the way that human beings—and only 
human beings—relate to the things we encounter and use.51 The things we encounter are 
always already intelligible or significant to us. I always encounter things as ‘mine’ to 
the extent that I understand the things around me in terms of the whole meaningful 
context of my life. After all, it is not as if I can ever be totally indifferent toward 
worldly things. Things are only ever disclosed to me as something, whether as 
something that will facilitate my everyday dealings [Umgang] with the world or as 
something that will frustrate these dealings.52 Even when I do not care about something, 
this ‘something’ is still intelligible to me as something that I do not care about. Strictly 
speaking, then, there is no ‘singular thing’ that stands over and against us, since things 
only make sense to us in relation to the total meaningful context of the projects with 
which we are engaged. 
                                                 
49 Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (1967). 
50 Ibid., p. 8. See also:  Seidel, 1970, pp. 35–39. 
51 “When innerworldly beings are discovered along with the being of Dasein, that is, when they become 
intelligible, we say that they have meaning [Sinn]. But strictly speaking, what is understood is not 
meaning, but beings [Seiende], or being [Sein].” (BT, §32, p. 146 [151]). See also: OHF, §21, p. 71. 
52 BT, §32, p. 144 [149]. 
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Hence, to pose the question of Being is, in a sense, tantamount to asking about the 
‘thingness’ of the thing. Sheehan observes that Heidegger overtly equates Being with 
the meaningfulness of things when he identifies ontology as “the explicit theoretical 
inquiry into the intelligibility of things.”53 Indeed, the Being question is uncanny, in the 
sense that the Being of beings is both obvious and obscure; both close and distant. We 
have an “inconspicuous familiarity” with Being, according to Heidegger,54 and this 
familiarity marks the fore-structure of our understanding. To even ask the question of 
Being, one must already have an awareness of what it is to be something, even if only in 
a confused manner. One cannot ask ‘where is the hammer?’ without already knowing 
what a ‘hammer’ is. The fact that we can ask the question ‘what is a thing?’ suggests 
that we must already be familiar with what ‘the thing’ is. In the very act of saying the 
‘is’, one makes a claim about the meaningful presence of something, about the Being of 
something. Such claims, in turn, can be understood and interpreted due to the fore-
structure of our understanding, which means we are already ‘familiar’ with what Being 
discloses.  
Overall, the ‘Being’ of things, what things ‘are’, names what they mean in the context 
of the particular ‘awhile’ of human life. Whenever we say a thing ‘is’, we make a claim 
about the Being of something. The problem, however, is that this same ‘is’ seems to 
limit Being to a particular entity,55 leading to the obliteration of the difference between 
Being and individual beings. 
                                                 
53 “[Ontologie als] das explizite Fragen nach dem Sinn des Seienden.”(BT, §4, p. 11 [12]), cited in 
Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, n. 63, p. 124. The removal of this passage from 
later editions of BT is “nothing short of a travesty of editing” for Sheehan.  
54 Heidegger, The Concept of Time: The First Draft of Being and Time, p. 15 [21]. 
55 Seidel observes that Heidegger traces the neglect of the ontological difference to an ambiguity in the 
Ancient Greek ‘τό ὄν’, which can be taken either in an existential or predicative sense (1970, p. 35). For 
more, see Heidegger’s “Moira (Parmenides, Fragment VIII, 34–41).” In Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn 
of Western Philosophy (1984), p. 88. 
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§5 Ontological Questions vs. Ontic Questions 
So far, I have discussed the question of Being as a question about the meaningful 
context of factic human life, about those historical surroundings that already make sense 
to us and which cannot be reduced to any individual being. For Heidegger, the 
difference between Being and beings is the ontological difference, and one way that he 
distinguishes his method of inquiry from the metaphysical tradition that precedes him is 
by distinguishing between ontological and ontic questions. As J. L. Mehta notes, 
ontological inquiry is a way of investigating the entities that are disclosed to us in terms 
of their being something.56 In other words, ontological questions are those questions 
directed at the essential57 structures that underpin and give rise to our understanding of 
beings: i.e., the way things are always meaningful things.  
Ontological questions are to be opposed to ontic questions, which do not ask after the 
Being of things, but simply ask after particular beings. It is through ontic questions that 
we come to know ‘facts’ about the characteristics of, and relations between, particular 
worldly beings.58 For example, if I describe this particular table in front of me as rickety 
and wooden, then I am offering an ontic description of the table. When I start to 
describe what makes the table what it is, however, then I am offering an ontological 
description. 
In this fashion, we can pose a range of both ontological and ontic questions about the 
same entity.59 To repeat an earlier point, Being is always the Being of something.60 This 
                                                 
56 Mehta, Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision, p. 41. 
57 N.B. ‘Essential’ here is taken from the German ‘Wesen’, and is not intended to suggest anything like a 
timeless ‘essential property’, but simply to those essential structures that make a being the being it is. For 
Heidegger, such essential structures are to be demonstrated in everyday life and “remain determinative in 
every mode of being of factical Dasein.” (BT, §5, 16-17 [17]). 
58 Ibid., §4, pp. 10–13 [12–15]; §7, pp. 34–35 [37–38]; §14, p. 63 [63]. 
59 See Kisiel in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1995). Kisiel stresses that the ontological 
can never be divorced from the ontic (p. 79), and that Heidegger acknowledged early on that ontological 
inquiry always has ontic ‘roots’ [‘Boden’]; i.e., that ontology must always emerge from the ontic (p. 6).  
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is not to suggest that there is some kind of one-to-one relation between Being and 
beings, but simply that there is no Being in isolation from particular beings. After all, 
things can be the things they are in many and various ways, depending on the 
circumstances we encounter them. When the scientist suggests this same table is a table 
because it is an aggregate of atomic particles, by virtue of the ‘is’ they are making an 
ontological claim about the Being of something; albeit by offering a particular ontic 
description.61 
To carry out an ontic inquiry is to skip over the broader context of our encounters with 
things and to focus only on particular beings. In our ontic inquires, domains of Being 
(e.g., nature, history, human life) are marked off and become thematized as objects of 
our investigation. Once thematized, these domains provide us with ‘fundamental 
concepts’ which are then simply taken for granted and become ossified.62 To cordon off 
a particular region of Being for theoretical investigation in this way is to reduce the field 
of that investigation to a select group of abstract entities, entities which can then be 
ascertained and ‘known’, rather than meaningfully interpreted. While all ontic inquires 
make implicit claims about Being, ontic inquires do not overtly raise the question of 
Being. Ontic inquires arise from a preconceived, narrow interpretation of Being on the 
basis of some particular being (or group of beings), and are therefore unable to 
recognise the ontological difference.63  
In the chapters that follow we will see that our traditional methods of inquiry lead us to 
overlook the ontological difference. In regard to the meaningfulness of our surrounding 
                                                                                                                                               
60 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982), §4, p.17. See also, Seidel, 1970, pp. 
35–39.  
61 For a more detailed illustration of ontic inquiry, see: Arthur Stanley Eddington, “Introduction.” In The 
Nature of the Physical World (2012), pp. xi–xix. 
62 Heidegger, BT, §3, p. 8 [9]. 
63 “We can conclude only that ‘being’ [‘Sein’] is not something like a being [Seienden]. Thus the manner 
of definition of beings which has its justification within limits—the ‘definition’ of traditional logic which 
is itself rooted in ancient ontology—cannot be applied to being.” (ibid., §1, p. 3 [4]). 
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world, our modern scientific inquiries inevitably presuppose some notion of what the 
world is. In scientific investigation, we thematize the world around us as an object of 
our inquiry and formulate the basic concept of ‘nature’. The problem addressed by 
fundamental ontology is that such an inquiry already takes beings as given, without 
inquiring how they might be given and why. Namely, our traditional ontological 
inquiries are limited to what they can tell us about what it means to be a thing, leading 
us to forget how our understanding of things is always structured historically. 
§6 Ontology and Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
It is out of this concern for the neglect of basic ontological questions, as well as his 
mentor Husserl’s injunction to “go back to the things themselves,” 64 that Heidegger 
demands a return to the ancient question of Being. Yet, at the same time, he insists that 
this return must acknowledge any kind of historical or theoretical prejudice. 
Accordingly, the method that leads Heidegger to align the question of Being with the 
question of meaning is the phenomenological method. Gadamer defines phenomenology 
as the attempt to describe phenomena without recourse to physiological–psychological 
explanations or preconceived principles.65 For Vycinas, the phenomenological attitude 
can be broadly understood as a ‘respectful stance’ toward our lived experience of the 
surrounding world.66  
Both Sheehan67 and Frederic-Wilhelm von Herrmann68 note that the basic focus of 
phenomenology is on how things are meaningful to human being. Things will become 
meaningful to us in accordance with the finite, historical situation of our own lives. 
                                                 
64 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations Vol. 1 (2001), p. 168. See also, Heidegger, 1996, §7, p. 30 
[34], Von Herrmann, 2013, Gadamer, 2004, pp. 235–245. 
65 Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, p. 51. 
66 Vycinas, Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, p. 7. 
67 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, pp. 117–118. 
68 Von Herrmann, Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the Concept of 
Phenomenology, p. 5. 
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Different historical periods are characterised by different understandings of what ‘the 
thing’ is. The phenomenon that we today call the ‘the sun’ and currently take to be a 
luminous sphere of plasma at the centre of our solar system showed itself to the people 
of 15th century Europe as a heavenly body that revolves around the earth. Prior to this, 
the people of Ancient Greece considered the sun as the chariot of the deity Helios. As 
we will see in chapter three, history is replete with similar examples.69 Given that 
meaning is always constituted historically, in our accounts of the things that make up 
our world, we must recognise the historical basis of the metaphysical and scientific 
claims that ground our modern understanding, since these claims are loaded with 
ontological assumptions. Instead, in our ontological inquires, we must shift our attention 
back to the meaningful world. In particular, we need to recognise there cannot be some 
eternal unchanging ground on which our knowledge rests; knowledge can only ever be 
partial human knowledge.  
Accordingly, Heidegger’s method of accounting for phenomena—his phenomenology—
is hermeneutic. Pöggeler describes hermeneutic phenomenology as “essentially 
temporal interpretation”.70 For Von Herrmann, hermeneutics is a-theoretical, by which 
he means that hermeneutics does not assume the static presence of things in advance.71 
Gadamer notes that Heidegger’s phenomenology is hermeneutic in the sense that the 
meaning of phenomena is “explicated” rather than merely “explained”.72 One makes no 
attempt to provide a ‘neutral description’ of phenomena, since phenomena are always 
disclosed differently in relation to the historical context of one’s factic life. Heidegger 
himself contrasts hermeneutics with logical analysis: hermeneutics is the way of 
                                                 
69 See also, Heidegger in WT, pp. 12–14. 
70 Pöggeler, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, p. 76. 
71 Von Herrmann, Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the Concept of 
Phenomenology, pp. 5–6. 
72 Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, p. 51. 
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explicating our facticity, which our traditional inquiries cannot account for.73 In short, 
Heidegger’s method of inquiry is distinguished from those methodological approaches 
that privilege the timeless presence of objects. Rather, he attempts to account for the 
way meaningful things are revealed to human beings over time. 
As I have outlined above, the question of Being should be taken as a question about the 
meaningful presence of things. The disclosure of Being is required for us to understand 
and interpret the things around us as meaningful things. Moreover, any response to this 
question will have to acknowledge the temporal structure of human life, since only 
human beings are able to understand what is disclosed by Being, and only ever in a 
partial way. The Being of the things we encounter cannot be observed by merely 
looking at singular things, nor can we analyse Being in terms of fixed metaphysical 
principles. We are only able to approach the question of Being hermeneutically—in 
relation to the broader historical context of factic human life. Therefore, ontology—the 
study of Being—is only possible as hermeneutic phenomenology.74 For Heidegger, the 
effectiveness of a method for ontology is determined by the extent that such a method is 
able to ‘confront’ the things themselves.75 Such a method should not simply ‘confront’ 
the presence of singular things, but ask after the way these things are brought to light for 
historical human beings. To do so is to ask after the meaning and ground of things, i.e. 
the Being of things. 
For Heidegger, this is precisely where our traditional metaphysical inquiries are 
wrongheaded. Human life is always factical: I always understand things in terms of my 
own situation before I understand them as singular objects. Only through hermeneutics 
are we able to make this ‘mineness’ explicit. In other words, the only way to investigate 
                                                 
73 Heidegger, OHF, §3, pp. 6–7. 
74 BT, §7, p. 33 [35]. 
75 Ibid., §7, p. 26 [27]. 
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what things are is to consider the way things are understood and interpreted by 
historical human beings. Without ‘Being’, there is no meaningful disclosure of things. 
Therefore, if we overlook the question of Being, we will always overlook our most 
basic relation to worldly things, which are always already meaningful.  
§7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined some of the methodological considerations that lead 
Heidegger to pose the question of Being, which I have approached here in terms of 
meaningful things. Needless to say, this is a complex issue. Heidegger’s approach to the 
Being question undergoes a number of changes throughout his writing, and it is not the 
intention of this dissertation to explore these changes. For our current purposes, I have 
focused our attention on Heidegger’s early commitment to ontological questions, which 
go beyond particular things, and ask after the way things are illuminated as things that 
are meaningfully related to factic human life. For Heidegger, modern metaphysics 
neglects the facticity of human life in favour of the static ‘objective’ characteristics of 
particular things. To limit ourselves to objects that stand over and against us is to forget 
the way we are primary involved with worldly things—an involvement that is never 
static, but always structured by temporality.  
It is due to this temporal structure that our surroundings are only ever disclosed to us 
partially, within the context of our own finite lives. The condition that makes possible 
all worldly phenomena—the Being of things—is not a thing, and so cannot be rendered 
in terms of rational or empirical theories, since these theories do not account for the way 
the Being of things is disclosed in accordance with the historical conditions of factic 
human life. Subsequently, if we do not question the metaphysical ontology of presence 
handed down to us, then we will be condemned to overlook our own facticity. And it is 
our facticity that underpins our immediate understanding of things as meaningful things. 
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Therefore, ontology must always begin with hermeneutic phenomenology: to ask after 
the Being or meaning of things we must return to our interpretations of the things 
themselves. 
In the next chapter, to further substantiate my thesis that modern scientific reason is 
unable to account for the meaningful world of historical human beings, I expand on 
Heidegger’s conception of the relation between human being and the world, which he 
terms ‘being-in-the-world’. This is the conception of the world and human being that I 
argue is presupposed and thus covered over by the scientific conception of reason. 
Heidegger uses the word Dasein to describe the structure of human existence. As 
Dasein, human beings are always meaningfully engaged with things, and cannot, for the 
most part, be understood in isolation from the meaningful things surrounding them. For 
Heidegger, we predominately engage with things as tools [zeuge] that are handy 
[zuhanden] to our projects, rather than as objects that are objectively present 
[vorhanden]. Therefore, our accounts of the world ought to start from the way we 
understand and interpret the meaningful things that surround us, since this is the most 
basic way that we come into contact with the world. 
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Chapter 2: World 
§8 Introduction 
In chapter one, I argued that the problem of Being is tantamount to the problem of 
meaning. I outlined how, according to Heidegger, the study of Being must avoid the 
presuppositions of metaphysical ontology and instead focus on the way things are 
meaningful for factical human beings. As we saw, we only encounter things in terms of 
our own finite perspective in a given historical period. Therefore, rather than focus on 
the static objects of modern metaphysics, fundamental ontological inquiry must be 
hermeneutic and consider how beings are meaningfully understood by human beings, 
who will always interpret what is disclosed in terms of the awhileness of their own 
lives. 
In this chapter, in order to highlight the limitations of scientific reason, and to offer 
another way of thinking about the relation between humans, world and nature, I present 
the notion of the meaningful world in which we live, for which, I claim, modern science 
cannot account. In doing so, I concentrate on Heidegger’s conceptions of ‘Dasein’ and 
‘the world’, as well as the relation between them, which he terms ‘being-in-the-
world’.76 Dasein is the structure of human existence, and as Dasein, we are the only 
beings who care for our own Being. This care for our own Being (viz. our facticity) 
means we have an ‘inconspicuous familiarity’ with the Being of beings. After all, only 
Dasein can pose and respond to the question of Being. Accordingly, in BT the focus of 
Heidegger’s ontological inquiry is Dasein.77  
As I have pointed out already, things must be in order for human beings to understand 
and interpret them as meaningful things. In this chapter, I extend my claim to contend 
                                                 
76 Ibid., §4, p.12 [13]; p. 39 [41]; §11–12, pp. 50–62 [52–62]  
77 Ibid., §5, p. 16 [16]. 
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that ‘being-in-the-world’ refers to the way human beings relate to and engage with 
things in terms of a broader, meaningful context, which I identify as our ‘surrounding 
world’ [‘Umwelt’]. In the next chapter, I concentrate specifically on the manner in 
which our modern scientific understanding is founded on the same metaphysical 
principles that have led us to neglect this meaningful surrounding world. 
At this stage, however, it is sufficient that we take heed of Werner Marx’s assertion that 
for Heidegger, ‘the world’ “does not stand ‘opposite’” to human being, but should be 
taken as an ‘opening up’ or bestowing of meaning.78 One can find support for this 
reading in the work of Richardson, who explains Heidegger’s conception of the world in 
terms of a “matrix of relations” [Bezugszusammenhang],79 which together, make up the 
‘total meaningfulness’ that constitutes the structure of the world.80 Similarly, Sheehan 
identifies the very structure of the world as meaningfulness.81 In a similar vein, against 
the modern ‘scientific’ conception of nature, I argue that ‘the world’ does not refer to a 
thing, or even a collection of things, but to the total meaningful horizon of human 
concern. Overall, following Heidegger, I argue that our naturalistic conceptions of the 
world are always derived from this broader horizon.  
§9 Dasein and Facticity vs. the Cartesian Subject 
As per his ‘destruction’ of Western metaphysics (cf. §3), Heidegger is at pains to avoid 
traditional conceptions of the ‘external’ world. One such conception is the theoretical 
divide between object and subject, which he traces to Descartes’ distinction between res 
extensa and res cogitans in the seventeenth century.82 According to this understanding, 
the human being is something substantially and essentially different from every other 
                                                 
78 Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, p. 184. 
79 Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 56. 
80 Ibid., p. 57. 
81 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, p. 123. 
82 Heidegger, BT, §6, pp. 21–24 [22–24]; §10, p. 45 [46]; §14, p. 66 [66]; §18, pp.87–99 [89–101].  
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thing that surrounds them.83 Yet, despite this distinction, the human being is still taken 
on the same level as a thing—albeit the thinking thing. As Cartesian subject, there is a 
metaphysical gulf between ourselves and our surrounding world: human beings are 
conceived of in terms of pure ego, with no ‘direct access’ to worldly things. All we can 
‘know’ is things as objects that are given to us in consciousness (cf. §20). While we are 
able to express what we are conscious of to others in the form of propositions, these 
propositions are not in themselves ‘guaranteed’ to say anything about the world—only 
about our own thinking. In order to verify that these propositions do say something 
about the world, they must correspond to the most abstract, ‘objective’ features of the 
things we encounter. As I discuss in chapter three, on this account, the world becomes 
reducible to a collection of objects that are represented in consciousness to the human 
subject. Briefly, we can say that by conceiving of the thing as an ‘object’, we limit our 
understanding of worldly things to representations that are supposedly given to our 
conscious ego, rather than as things that we encounter and use meaningfully.84  
In this regard, Heidegger marks a departure from his mentor Husserl. Heidegger rejects 
any notions of the self, the subject, ‘man’, or the transcendental ego. Rather, the priority 
of the question of Being leads Heidegger to rethink all traditional conceptions of human 
being. In BT he begins his inquiry with the hermeneutic analysis of Dasein, which he 
identifies as the structure of everyday human existence.85 Hence, as Von Herrmann 
argues, while Husserl sought to practice phenomenology in terms of how things appear 
                                                 
83 “…[O]n the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, 
non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an 
extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and 
can exist without it.” René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the 
Objections and Replies (2012), p. 54 [78].  
84 Heidegger, OHF, §21, p. 73. See also Heidegger in “The Thing”: “An independent, self-supporting 
thing may become an object if we place it before us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it to 
mind in a recollective re-presentation. However, the thingly character of the thing does not consist in 
terms of the objectness, the over-againstness, of the object.”  (1971, p. 167). 
85 OHF, p. 5. See also, BT, §4, pp. 10–13 [11–15]. 
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to the “reflective gaze” of the pure and timeless ego, Heidegger identified the starting 
point of ontology to be the factic life of Dasein.86  
As noted above, ‘facticity’ refers to the character of our own Being.87 That is, how we 
are always aware of our own Being by virtue of the way we meaningfully engage with 
things in terms of the particular awhileness of our own lives (cf. §3).88 According to 
Kisiel, Heidegger’s conception of ‘Dasein’ is a result of his earlier interest in factic life, 
so Dasein can (in a sense) be taken as an “alternate term” for facticity.89 Kisiel goes on 
to note that facticity is integral to the structure of human existence (viz., Dasein) insofar 
as the finitude of factic life continually shapes one’s own Dasein.90  
This finitude distinguishes Dasein from all other beings. Whereas other beings are 
factual, only Dasein is factical. In BT Heidegger remarks: “The factuality of the fact of 
Dasein, as the way in which every Dasein actually is, we call its facticity.”91 As Biemel 
reminds us, for Heidegger such terminological distinctions are intended to imply a 
broader change in our seeing and thinking about what is.92 Heidegger’s reasoning for 
employing the term ‘facticity’ is that the ‘factuality’ of Dasein is “ontologically 
fundamentally different” from anything that can be rendered as objectively present, like 
some “kind of stone.”93 The stone, after all, does not relate to itself or the things 
surrounding it meaningfully, in regard to any particular ‘awhile’, and therefore lacks 
facticity.  
                                                 
86 Von Herrmann, Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the Concept of 
Phenomenology, pp. 5–6. 
87 “Let us call this presence, possessed by each individual Dasein—one is it, or I am it—facticity” 
Heidegger, The Concept of Time: The First Draft of Being and Time, p. 35 [44].  
88 OHF, p. 5; §3, pp. 12–15; §6, pp. 24–27. 
89 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, p. 274. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Heidegger, BT, §12, p. 56 [56]. 
92 Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, p. 34. 
93 Heidegger, BT, §12, p. 56 [56]. 
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It is though facticity that Dasein is able to understand and interpret the factuality of 
things like the stone in such a way that these things make a difference to Dasein’s own 
Being. As factical Dasein, we are already aware of the Being of our own existence—
only Dasein exists, all other things are. We are aware of our own Being to the extent 
that we always find ourselves living within the context of a world that already is.94 For 
Biemel, the key difference between the Being of Dasein and the Being of the stone is 
that while the stone just ‘is’, Dasein is always ‘to-be’. Namely, the Being of Dasein 
cannot be determined in advance, Dasein can only be realised in terms of the future-
orientated projects that shape our sense of who we are.95 In short, only human beings 
can develop an attitude toward the future possibilities of their own Being, the stone 
cannot. It is this capacity to have an attitude toward ourselves and our own possibilities 
that means our own Being is already an issue for us.  
As the only being whose own Being is an issue, Dasein already stands in some ‘relation’ 
to Being qua Being. We do not, however, relate to Being as if ‘it’ were a being that we 
could encounter. Rather, to relate to Being is existential, it is part of the structure of our 
very existence. In the Letter on Humanism (1993), Heidegger emphasises the term 
‘openness’ when discussing the Being of beings. ‘Openness’ here simply refers to our 
immediate understanding of things as meaningful things: we must already be ‘open’ to 
the things around us for these things to be ‘open’ to us. Being ‘creates’ an opening and 
human beings are thrown into the world, which is already ‘opened up’ or framed by a 
historically constituted understanding of what is.96 Hence, what Being discloses to 
Dasein cannot be reduced to metaphysical conceptions like sensory perception or 
                                                 
94 N.B. To be sure, there is a basic intentionality to all questioning, so our awareness of Being is 
illustrated by our very asking after it. As Metha points out: “Whenever we ask a question, we are seeking 
for something and this quest takes its direction from a preliminary awareness of what we are looking 
for—this is what the question is about” (1976, p. 89).  
95 Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, p. 34. 
96 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism.” In Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to the Task 
of Thinking (1964), ed. David Farrell Krell (1993), p. 210. 
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cognitive representation; these are already historically situated notions. Rather, beings 
are only open to Dasein to the extent that Dasein is already open to beings. As Sheehan 
notes: “we are able to do such ‘traversing of an open space’…only because we already 
are such an open space.”97  
In On the Essence of Truth (1993), Heidegger describes Dasein as both ‘ek-sistent’ and 
‘in-sistent’.98 On Richardson’s interpretation, ‘ek-sistent’ refers to the way Dasein is 
structured to ‘stand outside’ its own being, ex-posed [aussetzend] toward the openness 
of Being qua Being.99 At the same time, as Dasein we are in-sistent: we tend to neglect 
the question of Being by focusing only on the particular beings we encounter,100 leaving 
us prone to unquestioningly accept the tradition of thinking we are born into. As I noted 
earlier in regard to BT, Being always transcends particular beings, inasmuch as beings 
are only intelligible to human beings in terms of a broader context of meaning. 
Likewise, as ek-sistent, Dasein moves beyond beings that are opened up (disclosed) by 
Being and toward the Opening itself. For Richardson, this ‘Opening’ is what Heidegger 
identifies as ‘the world’ in BT.101 This leads Richardson to suggest that for Heidegger, 
the problem with accounting for Being and the problem with accounting for the world 
are, at root, identical.102 Taken together, it is as both ek-sistent and in-sistent that Dasein 
is ‘being-in-the-world’. Briefly, we can say that the world here refers to that Opening 
that we ourselves are always already open to, or as Sheehan puts it: “the meaning-giving 
context opened up by and as ex-sistence.”103  
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In the Concept of Time (2011), Heidegger remarks that “Dasein, as the opened-up 
[erschlossen] state of ‘being-in’, is the condition for encountering the world”.104 This 
encounter with the world (our being-in) initially takes on the character of thrownness 
[Geworfenheit], to the extent that we always find ourselves thrown amidst a range of 
possibilities that we are able to take up or dismiss.105 For Heidegger, we are these 
possibilities; there is no pre-given, timeless essence that constitutes our existence.106 Put 
simply, human being is not a thing with an unchanging essence. This is one of the 
further insights that distinguishes Heidegger from the metaphysical tradition that 
precedes him: Dasein cannot be reduced to any essential property or pre-given category 
such as animal rationale, cogitans, Homo sapiens, etc.107  
§10 Being-There and Concern 
Given that Dasein is ontologically, fundamentally distinct from other beings, one cannot 
describe Dasein in the same terms one would describe other entities, since these terms 
are steeped in metaphysical assumptions. Dasein is not some-thing that is on par with 
other things or even alongside them. In a sense, Dasein has more in common with an 
‘event’ than anything like an object or subject. Specifically, as Heidegger says, ‘Dasein’ 
marks the event of disclosure.108 For Heidegger, truth is the disclosure of Being.109 As 
noted, Being is the light that illuminates particular beings, but ‘is not’ a being that is 
ever disclosed or brought to light. The significance of Dasein is that only Dasein is open 
to what is disclosed, only Dasein is able to understand beings as meaningful things—a 
relation to things that is not reducible to sensory perception. To return to an earlier 
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point, our comportment toward meaningful things does not primarily take the form of 
perceiving singular things that we understand as ‘outside’ of us. Instead, things are 
immediately disclosed to us as something meaningfully related to the projects of our 
everyday lives.  
In this way, the Being of beings can only be an issue for Dasein, inasmuch as only 
Dasein encounters things within the world as things that make sense or have meaning at 
all. As I have mentioned already, and will discuss further below (cf. §13), our everyday 
engagement with things rarely resembles anything like simply ‘looking’ at things in 
their singularity. On the contrary, we mostly find ourselves doing things, and the ‘there’ 
[‘Da’] in the ‘being-there’ of ‘Dasein’ refers to this concernful engagement with 
things—to our meaningful engagement with things. An engagement that always makes 
sense to us in terms of the broader context of our surrounding world. As Dasein, we are 
always ‘there’ for ourselves to the extent that we find ourselves taking care of things for 
the sake of some project, which means we are already somewhat familiar with the Being 
of things that we encounter and use.110  
As both ek-sistent and in-sistent, human being is always ‘being-there’, and as ‘being-
there’ our primary engagement with the surrounding world is structured by ‘care’ 
[‘Sorge’]. In and through ‘care’, Dasein is inextricably immersed by the surrounding 
world—or, as Heidegger puts it: “The being which is essentially constituted by being-
in-the-world is itself always its ‘there’”.111 Care takes us ‘there’ to the extent that in our 
day to day lives, we are rarely aware of the singular things we use, because our concern 
is ‘there’ with some broader project that we find ourselves undertaking.112 For Lee 
Braver, what is initially counter-intuitive about this idea is that “we’re not in the there, 
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we are the there”.113 Sheehan observes that “…our engagement with meaning is 
structured as care…”114 Moreover, he notes that this structure “cuts across” the 
aforementioned divide between mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa).115 That is, 
we are this structure: care is not something we do, but makes us who we are. Heidegger 
himself claims that “Dasein is in terms of what it takes care of”.116 Furthermore, care is 
the “the primordial being of Dasein itself”.117  
As Raymond Tallis explains, it is through the structure of care that past, present and 
future—which are separated in our ‘vulgar’ understanding—form a unified whole.118 In 
chapter one, we discussed how our meaningful engagement with things is always 
structured by temporality (cf. §3), which is enacted by our taking care of the things we 
use. Through care, our past makes sense to us in terms of the projects we are involved 
with in the present, and through these projects we direct ourselves toward the future. 
Care is the very structure of Dasein’s meaningful engagement with worldly things, and 
for this reason, without care, there is no Dasein. Human life cannot be thought of in 
terms of res cogitans, which is supposedly independent of this concerned involvement. 
As Dasein, human existence is always characterised by ‘being-there’ through care—an 
involvement with our surroundings which, far from being static or timeless, is 
fundamentally temporal in the sense of the ‘awhileness’ of factic Dasein. Therefore, as 
mentioned above the meaningful engagement with things constitutive of Dasein cannot 
be rendered in terms of static metaphysical principles, but only interpreted 
hermeneutically, in the context of our finite relation to the beings around us.  
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§11 Being-in 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic analysis of Dasein leads him to the notion of world. One of 
the key claims in BT is that human being is always ‘being-in-the-world’.119 As noted, 
Heidegger observes that in our most basic engagements with everyday life, singular 
things do not stand over and against us, but are always caught up with activities and 
projects that we are already undertaking. Mehta observes that activities like producing, 
cultivating, using as well as not using, neglecting and so forth, are all modes of ‘being-
in’ that Heidegger describes as ‘taking care’ [Besorgen],120 which is itself a part of the 
broader care structure discussed above. 
These projects are by no means limited to any grand aspirations for the future we might 
have, but extend to those small-scale, thoughtless acts that we are constantly engaging 
in. Everything we do, we do in the service of some project. After breakfast I brush my 
teeth and have a shower—all with the ‘project’ of starting my day with fresh breath. To 
consider things as totally divorced from these projects is to overlook the way we 
actually deal with them, and thus to overlook our most basic way of relating to the 
things around us. In other words, our understanding of things does not come from mere 
observation, but from using things in the context of the projects we are engaged with, as 
per our being-in-the-world. 
As I already noted, Dasein cannot be reduced to any fixed essence or predetermined 
category. This being so, Dasein is not ‘in’ the world like other things are. Rather, the 
‘in’ of being-in-the-world refers to this concernful involvement with things, and not our 
spatial location within some other kind of entity—as if we were merely ‘in’ the world 
like the toothpaste is ‘in’ the bathroom drawer. Rather, we find ourselves already being-
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there, ‘in’ the world, dealing with meaningful things, and carrying out projects in a 
context we already understand.  
§12 Four Senses of ‘The World’ 
‘The world’, then, does not refer to our position on the planet Earth. So to further 
distinguish the terms of his investigation from those of traditional metaphysics, 
Heidegger outlines four different senses of the term ‘world’.121 The first sense that he 
outlines refers to commonplace notion of the world I have already alluded to, that is, as 
a giant ‘container’ where all particular entities are located.  
The second sense of ‘world’ is ontological, and pertains to the Being of entities within 
the world, i.e., the way things are. This second sense can denote any region of entities, 
and so can refer to any kind of ‘regional’ ontology, like those of mathematics or 
physics. We express this sense of ‘the world’ in everyday phrases like ‘the world of the 
microbiologist’ or ‘the world of the engineer’.122  
Heidegger identifies the third sense of world as the ‘pre-ontological’ public world. He 
notes that while this is an ontic conception of the world, we should not take this 
description as in the first description of the world, that is, as the total collection of 
entities that are objectively present to Dasein. This third sense, rather, refers to Dasein’s 
surrounding world, that meaningful context where Dasein is thrown and finds itself 
already immersed. This notion of the world refers to the matrix of ‘total 
meaningfulness’ described by Richardson.123 According to Von Herrmann, this sense of 
the world refers to the “worldly whole of significance”, which is not mediated by our 
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sensory perception.124 This is not a world that consists of fixed objects that are 
represented to our consciousness, but the publically interpreted, meaningful context of 
human concern. In terms of my previous example, we could take this as the bathroom 
where the things that I use to brush my teeth already make sense to me. Not the physical 
dimensions of the bathroom itself, but the meaningful context of my using things in 
order to brush my teeth each day. This third sense refers to our surrounding world, 
which is the conception of the world that I contend is presupposed by the modern 
scientific conception of ‘nature’. This is the predominant way that Heidegger (and 
myself) use the term ‘world’. 
The fourth and final sense of world that Heidegger identifies refers to the notion of 
‘worldliness’ or ‘worldhood’ [Weltlichkeit]. Worldliness refers to the a priori conditions 
which structure Dasein’s surrounding world; that is, the conditions that underpin and 
give rise to the third sense of the world.125 In our everyday lives, the projects we find 
ourselves undertaking already make sense to us in terms of a broader horizon, and this is 
due to our being worldly. Our worldliness is not just limited to our surrounding world, 
but extends to the historical conditions we find ourselves thrown into. In order to 
understand ourselves as ‘conscious’ subjects in a ‘natural world’ of non-conscious 
objects we must be able to adhere to particular assumptions that we have inherited from 
the Cartesian metaphysical tradition, and we are only able to understand ourselves in 
terms of these assumptions due to our worldliness as Dasein. 126 
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While one of Heidegger’s ultimate aims is to provide an account of our worldliness in 
the most fundamental sense, in order to do this he must first account for the pre-
ontological world described by the third sense of the world: that is, Dasein’s 
surrounding world. 
§13 Handiness and Objective Presence  
After putting forward these four definitions of ‘world’, Heidegger turns his investigation 
toward the Being of things that we come across in our surrounding world. He identifies 
two fundamental categories: ‘objective presence’ [Vorhandenheit]127 and ‘handiness’ 
[Zuhandenheit].128 For Heidegger, philosophers in the tradition have gone astray in their 
ontological claims by considering things solely in terms of objective presence, rather 
than taking things as tools that are handy.  
A thing is objectively present when we consider it in theoretical abstraction, when we 
bring the objectified character of a thing into the open. To take a thing as objectively 
present means to take the thing out of the context of our projects. The thing becomes an 
object that is ‘frozen’ outside of the time and place it occupies, as it is in the modern 
scientific conception, thus removing the thing from our dealings with it. By contrast, 
‘handiness’ refers specifically to this everyday dealing with things, which is prior to any 
theoretical understanding. We encounter handy things through what Heidegger 
identifies as pragmata [πραγματα], that is, ‘equipment’ or ‘tools’, which we only 
encounter within a broader meaningful context.129 Tools refer to those ordinary and 
mundane things that we use each day: toothbrushes, toothpaste, dental floss, etc. Such 
tools are ‘handy’ insofar as we encounter them as something that will either help or 
hinder us in our projects. 
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Initially, we encounter things as tools that are handy to our projects. Any theoretical 
understanding is only possible once we have already separated things from our 
involvement with them, when we consider things as singular things that are objectively 
present. According to Heidegger, the character of the tools we use is always dependent 
on a broader meaningful context. There is no singular tool or tool-in-itself, because 
tools are only intelligible in the context of our being-in-the-world.130 Tools are only able 
to be tools within a framework of referential relations; handy things only make sense to 
us in terms of some action or project we are already undertaking. The tools I use to 
brush my teeth always refer to the broader project of avoiding bad breath, which itself 
refers to an even broader project, like my desire to talk to others without fear of 
embarrassment—which, even further, refers to the Dasein of others, who I encounter 
and recognise as ‘being there’ with me.131 
For Heidegger, this involvement with the world means that we have an understanding of 
our surroundings that comes prior to any theoretical understanding, which is 
demonstrated by the way we deal with tools in everyday life. When I brush my teeth in 
the morning, I already find myself within a meaningful context: I understand what the 
toothbrush is, since I am already using it to brush my teeth. The toothbrush, in turn, 
refers to the toothpaste, which I similarly understand as toothpaste since I am already 
applying it to the brush. Taken together, all these relations between tools refer to some 
broader context, like my wish to have fresh breath so that I don’t offend other people. It 
is important to note, however, that when I present this description, I am already 
isolating things out of their context, away from my actual involvement with them.  
One of the reasons that we disregard the tools we use is because they do not arrest our 
attention while we use them. Their Being ‘withdraws’, so to speak. We are never 
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concerned with handy things in their singularity, because when we use tools, we direct 
our concern toward some task we are already undertaking.132 After all, I rarely think of 
the toothbrush while I am using it, I am simply too distracted by my desire to avoid 
halitosis. The things Dasein interacts with always refer to projects that Dasein is already 
concerned with, as well as other Dasein, who we can recognise as undertaking projects 
that are comparable to our own. Heidegger identifies the totality of these references—
which are always pointing toward Dasein’s projects and concerns—as the surrounding 
world. This totality or ‘matrix’ of referential relations is intelligible to us because of our 
worldliness, and it is due to our worldliness that we are, for the most part, completely 
immersed in our projects.133  
§14 Nature 
The world, then, in the main sense that Heidegger intends in BT, refers to the broader, 
meaningful context of Dasein’s concern. The world is not our immediate physical 
location, but the meaningful place where we dwell. To be human is to be-in-the-world. 
The world ‘is’ not some particular being or phenomenon that we can come across in 
experience, but the total historical horizon that informs our encounters with 
phenomena. We do not primarily relate to the world around us as if ‘it’ were some 
external object or container which holds us and everything else that we encounter. To 
outline all those particular entities that we can observe in isolation from our 
involvement with them—like we do in scientific investigation—is to tell us nothing 
about our everyday engagement with the world. The world is not a thing, nor a 
collection of things, so we must avoid designating it as such with an ‘is’. As Heidegger 
claims in The Origin of the Work of Art (1993): “The world worlds, and is more fully in 
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being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at 
home”.134 
As I discuss further in the next chapter, on Heidegger’s account, our modern naturalistic 
conceptions of the world do not account for this integral aspect of human existence, 
leaving us prone to overlook the world as the broader meaningful context of human 
concern.135 In BT, he argues that our commitment to describing the world purely in 
terms of modern natural science tacitly presupposes the very existence of the world we 
are trying to describe. He notes that, “Nature is itself a being which is encountered 
within the world and is discoverable on various paths and stages.”136 That is to say, ‘the 
world’ of human being is not reducible to any naturalistic conception, since it is only 
from already being-in a meaningful world that we can begin to formulate such a 
conception. The natural world is always derivative of our surrounding world, which is 
always already meaningful to us. 
For Heidegger, our traditional ontological accounts overlook the worldliness of Dasein 
in favour of examining those things that are objectively present in the world, the total 
arrangement of which we call ‘nature’. Worldliness, though, is ontological, and cannot 
be reduced to anything objectively present in the world. Thus we can never reach 
worldliness on the basis of our modern conception of nature. The world does not 
primarily refer to the external space ‘outside’ of us that ‘consists’ of various objects, but 
to the historically constituted place where things matter to us, as per our being-in-the-
world. This is important to keep in mind, since it is this notion of the world as the 
meaningful place of human concern that I claim is overlooked by modern scientific 
rationality. 
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§15 Conclusion 
For the most part, at this stage of his thought, Heidegger is concerned with the project of 
fundamental ontology, and so he wants to uncover the ground for all other ontological 
inquiries. To accomplish this, he puts forward the method of hermeneutic 
phenomenology, which I discussed in chapter one as a way of explicating the facticity 
that plays a crucial role in our comportment toward meaningful things. In this chapter, I 
have discussed Heidegger’s conception of the structure of factic human existence, 
which he terms Dasein. As Dasein, we always find ourselves already living in terms of 
our surrounding world. Yet, we do not relate to the world around us like we do to an 
object or to a being that we encounter, but as the broader meaningful horizon that is 
disclosed to us in accordance with the projects with which we are involved. This 
meaningful involvement constitutes the worldliness of Dasein, and it is by virtue of our 
worldliness that we always find ourselves being-in-the-world. Taken together, we 
always already understand ourselves in terms of the broader meaningful horizon of our 
historical surrounding world. More often than not, we are absorbed with these 
surroundings when using tools in order to undertake the projects that make up our 
everyday lives. Therefore, contra metaphysics, we do not primarily relate to the world 
around us in terms of the objectively present character of singular things. Nor do we 
encounter the world as an object. Prior to any theoretical insight, there is our 
involvement with things in terms of the totality of references or ‘total meaningfulness’ 
that structures the world around us.  
As I have stressed, to render all beings in terms of static metaphysical descriptions is to 
pass over the structure of human existence, which—unlike things—is always factic. 
Therefore, if we seek a fundamental, ontological account of our relation to the world, 
we must not presuppose the world as some fixed object that is opposed to the human 
subject. While the modern sciences can offer us remarkable descriptions of objectively 
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present things, such descriptions are only meaningful on the basis of Dasein’s openness 
to Being, which is always primary. As mentioned, Dasein must already be open to 
Being in order to understand and interpret things as things at all, a relation to things that 
is always conditioned by the historical circumstances of one’s life.  
To extend our discussion further, in the next chapter, I argue that the modern scientific 
interpretation maintains the Cartesian split inherent in modern metaphysical ontology. 
In contrast to the hermeneutic method described above, modern science is 
mathematical. Modern science is ‘mathematical’ in the sense that scientific research 
presupposes a mathematical conception of what the world is (i.e., nature). This 
conception of the world can never reach beyond what is objectively present and reveal 
to us how things comes to be something in terms of our being-in-the-world. While it 
may be true that every now and again we do happen to merely observe singular things in 
the world—taking up the role of a disinterested observer—primarily, we are caught up 
in our own projects, which are always already taking place in a world that is not 
reducible to a purely naturalistic conception. In some respects, the primacy of this 
meaningful world may seem trite or obvious, but as I argue in the next chapter, for 
Heidegger, it is precisely this obviousness that has led our traditional metaphysical and 
scientific understandings astray, condemning us to overlook what is closest to us: the 
meaningful presence of things. 
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Chapter 3: Reason 
§16 Introduction 
In the first chapter, I discussed the question of Being as a question about the meaningful 
presence of things for factic human beings. In the second chapter, I claimed that things 
always initially make sense to us in terms of a broader historical horizon, which I 
identified as our surrounding world. Overall, against traditional metaphysical ontology, 
I noted how any response to the problem of Being—or as I have framed it, the problem 
of meaning—will change over time, so there can be no fixed or eternal approach to 
ontological inquiry. Rather, if we wish to take these historical changes into account, our 
inquiry must be hermeneutic; we must not consider things as separate from their 
historical context.  
In this chapter, to further consider Heidegger’s critique of the reduction of our 
surrounding world to ‘nature’, I focus specifically on two of Heidegger’s works after 
BT: namely, The Age of The World View (1976)137 and The Principle of Reason 
(1991).138 I argue that in these works Heidegger extends his critique of Cartesian 
metaphysics, which he initially puts forward in BT, in order to make a specific critique 
in regards to modern scientific knowledge. I suggest that the major insight underpinning 
both of these works is that our modern scientific approach to ontological questions is 
already shaped by the metaphysical divide between the thing as ‘object’ and the human 
being as ‘subject’. As I have already mentioned, on this account our surrounding world 
becomes reducible to a collection of fixed objects that we call ‘nature’. Yet, as 
Heidegger already noted in BT, we never encounter things as objects, nor do we relate 
to the world as if ‘it’ were an object. Such a way of thinking only makes sense within 
our own historically situated interpretation of what is. In light of this, I discuss the 
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historical ways of thinking that have come to shape our contemporary scientific 
understanding of the ‘natural’ world. 
In AWV, (and to a lesser extent, What is a Thing?)139 Heidegger outlines the 
metaphysical grounds that lead us to think of the world as something opposed to us, 
which we have a ‘view’ of. He traces this way of thinking to the philosophy of 
Descartes, whose rationalist project he compares to the Ancient Greek conception of tà 
mathémata [τὰ μαθήματα] or what has become ‘mathematics’. In PR, he discusses the 
relation between reason and subjectivity further, in terms of Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, which, he argues, presupposes the same 
Cartesian split mentioned above. For Heidegger, the principle of reason places a 
demand on the human being to provide reason or grounds140 for worldly things. Yet, as I 
will discuss, any such grounds—far from describing some totally universal and 
objective ‘reality’—are an interpretation. An interpretation that is based on the 
unchanging character of things and which skips over the way human beings always 
encounter things meaningfully, in terms of a broader, historical world-horizon. 
Overall, I contend that modern scientific reason takes the metaphysical conception of 
the ‘natural world’ (described above) for granted by reducing all that is existent to what 
is objectively present. On this account, things become objects that can be researched 
and ‘known’ on the basis of pre-set formal laws.141 In AWV, Heidegger refers to this 
way of seeing the world as the ‘objectification of Being’.142 Against this scientific view, 
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I claim Heidegger’s work draws our attention to the fact that this interpretation is based 
on a range of historical assumptions, which, in turn, raises the question of why we take 
this ‘objectification’ of Being to be the primary or only way to understand things we 
encounter. Following Heidegger, I claim that this scientific understanding is only one 
way of understanding and interpreting that which Being discloses. 
§17 The Objectification of Being 
I have stressed already how our understanding of the surrounding world is always 
shaped by the tradition of thinking we are born into. As we saw in regard to the 
‘destruction’ of the tradition in BT, Heidegger wants to uncover the ways that the 
history of thinking has influenced our understanding of ourselves and the world around 
us. In BT he singles out the metaphysics of Descartes, which in AWV, he terms the 
‘objectification of Being’. He claims that Cartesian metaphysics gives form to our 
interpretations of the world by putting forward a particular theory of truth, and that our 
modern scientific understanding of the ‘natural world’ is grounded in the Cartesian 
account of truth ‘as certainty’.143 Below, I explain this notion of truth in terms of the 
aforementioned distinction between res extensa and res cogitans. Beforehand, however, 
it is worth pointing out that Heidegger’s critique of Cartesianism in AWV takes a 
different approach to the one we find in BT.144 Rather than formulating his inquiry on 
the basis of Dasein, Heidegger turns to the way Being is disclosed historically. He asks: 
“what conception of truth gives form to our contemporary understanding of the things 
around us and that we meaningfully deal with each day?”145  
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Heidegger poses this question because different conceptions of reason give rise to 
different conceptions of truth, which together, give form to different interpretations of 
our surrounding world. For Heidegger, Being and truth always “go together”.146 
Namely, the way we understand truth will shape the way we understand the Being of 
things that we encounter. To return to an earlier point (cf. §6), the way things are 
disclosed to human beings is always dependent on the historical context of one’s life. 
As human beings we are always limited to our own historical situation, we cannot 
immediately understand the things around us in every possible and conceivable way, 
since our understanding is always confined to our own finite perspective. As Heidegger 
notes in The Origin of The Work of Art: “Each being we encounter and which 
encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of presencing in that it always withholds 
itself at the same time in concealedness.”147 Put simply, things never show themselves 
in their entirely or fullness, but are always revealed and concealed to us differently, in 
terms of our own historical situation.  
Following this line of argument, in AWV Heidegger suggests that it would be 
nonsensical to judge modern science as somehow more exact than Ancient Greek 
conceptions of episteme, or medieval notions of doctrina and scientia.148 These former 
historical periods were characterised by different interpretations of the Being of beings, 
which demand a different way of seeing and asking after what ‘is’. After all, one 
struggles to even imagine the difficulty of trying to explain to a citizen of Ancient 
Greece that the sun is an ‘object’ made of ‘plasma’ at the centre of ‘the solar system’. 
This kind of description would simply not make sense to the Ancient Greek.  
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For Heidegger, modern science is to be carefully distinguished from Ancient Greek and 
Medieval science. The essence of modern science is research, which he compares to the 
Ancient Greek notion of tà mathémata [τὰ μαθήματα].149 
§18 Tà Mathémata 
While tà mathémata is a historical precursor to our modern conception of mathematics, 
tà mathémata has a much broader meaning in the Ancient Greek, and is not strictly 
limited to the calculable or numerical.150 Rather, in WT Heidegger explains tà 
mathemata as what is learnable, and by extension, what is teachable.151 Kisiel describes 
tà mathemata as a “learning process” through which “we come to know what we 
already know.”152 Specifically, tà mathemata refers to that which we ‘bring’ to things in 
order to understand and use them. As I discussed in chapter two, for Heidegger our 
primary engagement with things is using handy things in the context of our concern for 
the projects we undertake. In WT he observes that when we learn something, we do not 
‘learn the thing’ per se, but learn to use things for some purpose—often through 
practice.153 Before we can learn or practice to use things, we must already be familiar 
with them in some sense. Learning to drive a car, for example, demands a prior 
familiarity with what a car is and what things like gear sticks and steering wheels do, 
and such a familiarity comes before one is even in the driver’s seat.  
If we were not already familiar with things in this way, then we would not even 
recognise them as things we can learn to use in the first place. For Heidegger, this 
familiarity with things prior to our actual dealing with them falls under the scope of tà 
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mathémata. As he notes: “The μαθήματα, the mathematical, is that ‘about’ things which 
we really already know. Therefore we do not first get it out of things, but, in a certain 
way, we bring it already with us.”154 Hence, while for the Ancient Greeks the 
mathematical cannot be reduced to the numerical, the numerical falls under the scope of 
the mathematical in this sense.155 Namely, our understanding of number comes prior to 
our actual dealing with the things we count: numbers are not ‘in’ the things themselves, 
but are a conception that we ‘bring’ to things when we interpret them as something 
countable. Before I can say the car I’m driving has four wheels, I must already know 
what the ‘four’ stands for. I cannot find the ‘four’ in any of the wheels themselves; 
‘four’ only makes sense within a broader context. 
§19 Science as Research 
In AWV, Heidegger traces the origins of modern science to this historical notion of tà 
mathémata, which he claims has become limited to the calculable and numerical. He 
argues that modern science is mathematical to the extent that scientific research 
involves following a pre-set, formal procedure, which itself entails a predetermined 
conception of what the world is. Kisiel opposes the modern conception of tà mathémata 
to the hermeneutic thinking that I outlined in §6.156 Hermeneutic phenomenology aims 
to interpret the Being of things in terms of the historical situation they are encountered. 
By contrast, mathematical science turns on a conception of the thing that is based on a 
series of “self-evident axioms”157 or ‘laws’ that determine what can be known in 
advance. On this scientific account, the world of our living is reduced to the lawful 
arrangement of objectively present entities and events that we call ‘nature’. This 
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naturalistic conception is mathematical to the extent that things are prefigured as 
mathematical.  
In this sense, Heidegger is not simply referring to the methods of modern science, but to 
the conditions for the possibility of such methods. He argues that the possibility of 
modern scientific experiment can only arise after the projection of a particular 
naturalistic blueprint or “ground-plan” [‘Grundrisse’].158 As Don Idhe explains, for 
Heidegger, science “makes a projection upon nature and only works within the limits of 
this projection.”159 The possibility of modern scientific research does not arise from our 
surrounding world being somehow inherently mathematical. Rather, the practice of 
modern science is only possible once there has been a shift in our understanding, once 
we have already taken the world around us to be reducible to the mathematical–
scientific conception of nature.160  
Heidegger offers us an example of such a shift in understanding in WT when he outlines 
some of the key differences between the Aristotelian and Newtonian conceptions of 
motion.161 Again, he suggests that the historical changes in the way human beings 
understand certain phenomena—in this case, motion—reveal a much broader, total 
reconfiguration in the way we interpret and understand the Being of worldly things.162 
On Heidegger’s account, for Aristotle, the capacity for motion lies ‘within’ the nature of 
the particular body. Particular bodies move according to their own distinct nature, and 
since heavenly bodies have a different nature to earthly bodies, they move differently to 
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one another.163 By contrast, Heidegger cites the ‘corpus omne’ or ‘every body’ in 
Newton’s law of inertia164 to illustrate that Newton makes no such distinction between 
heavenly and earthly bodies. Rather, for Newton, all bodies move with uniform 
linearity, until some ‘force’ disrupts them. Further, as Heidegger points out, ‘force’ is at 
the same time defined as “that whose impact results in a declination from rectilinear, 
uniform motion.”165 i.e., as that which disturbs linear movement.  
Subsequently, the human understanding of what motion ‘is’ changes in order to accord 
with this formal law. Such laws entail a particular definition of what things ‘are’ that we 
take to be universal and self-evident,166 and which, in turn, form the basis of the way we 
understand all that ‘is’. It is this claim to ‘self-evidence’ that Heidegger takes issue with. 
He writes that prior to its discovery, Newton’s law of inertia was not simply ‘unknown’ 
but “[n]ature and Being in general were experienced in such a way that it would have 
been senseless.”167 Namely, there is a shift in the understanding of ‘nature’ which 
changes from being the “inner principle” of things, to the lawful relation between points 
of mass connected in space and time.168 Motion is taken ‘outside’ of the particular body 
and reconfigured in terms of a universal law that all bodies are ruled by.  
In regard to tà mathémata, this historical example is useful for revealing the 
mathematical foundation of modern physics, as well as the modern sciences at large. 
Despite the purported ‘empirical basis’ of the sciences, the practice of modern physics 
turns on a conception of what the thing is that is not derived from empirical observation, 
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but from formal laws that cannot be encountered or observed. We can never encounter a 
‘singular body’ that is “left to itself” and which moves with total uniformity.169 As 
Heidegger notes, after figures like Galileo and Newton, our understanding of worldly 
things is reduced to objectively present “spatiotemporal kinetic magnitudes” rather than 
tools that are handy to our projects.170 Accordingly, the mathematical project of modern 
science leads the scientist to make claims that run contrary to our everyday engagement 
with things themselves: how exactly does one encounter and use a “spatiotemporal 
kinetic magnitude”?  
I have stressed already how our meaningful encounters with things do not take the form 
of our sensing objects that are represented to us in consciousness. Rather, things are 
immediately meaningful to us in terms of our surrounding world. By contrast, modern 
science is mathematical to the extent that practitioners of modern science work with an 
a priori conception of the world, i.e., lawful ‘nature’. The research worker takes this 
naturalistic account for granted on the basis of pre-established “fundamental 
conceptions”171 and “self-evident axioms”172 like the law of inertia described above. 
Scientific knowledge, then, is the result of a process that is divorced from our actual 
encounters with meaningful things. 
Heidegger argues that these natural laws—which are purely formal and never 
encountered—are confirmed, disconfirmed and modified by means of the modern 
research experiment. The defining characteristic of the modern experiment for 
Heidegger is the way the research worker takes these natural laws—which are ‘already 
known’—as their point of departure, thereby discarding as ‘knowable’ anything that is 
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inconsistent with this preconception.173 The research experiment sets up a field of 
investigation that formulates the objects of its inquiry on the basis of pre-established 
natural laws.174 Such laws are deemed universally self-evident, and so more reliable 
than our everyday ‘subjective’ encounters with handy things. 
To repeat, the problem is that the scientific conception of the world is not self-evident, 
but a historically grounded interpretation, one that is only intelligible to us after we find 
ourselves living ‘in’ a world that is publically interpreted as reducible to natural laws 
and processes. In short, the possibility of modern experiment only arises once we 
already understand the world in mathematical terms. In regard to modern metaphysics—
or as Heidegger terms it in AWV ‘the objectification of Being’—the researcher 
conceives of beings a priori as objectively present mathematical entities, which can be 
ascertained, measured and certified rather than encountered and used meaningfully. On 
this account, we totally separate things from our broader dealings with them, leading us 
to forget that we are always initially being-in-the-world. 
Hence, modern science—like the metaphysical tradition that gave rise to it—is founded 
on a predetermined conception of what is. Kisiel notes that the scope of any scientific 
inquiry is limited by preconceptions that are not determined scientifically. He draws on 
the example of modern biology, which operates within a pre-set field of investigation 
that is based on a range of assumptions that are taken to be characteristic of ‘life’.175 For 
example, notions like ‘motion’ or ‘growth’ are not drawn from scientific method but 
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from metaphysical concepts that are taken for granted.176 In other words, modern 
science is grounded in a metaphysics that it does not recognise. For Kisiel, the scientist 
cannot tell us what ‘life’ is without taking up the role of metaphysician, which means 
that modern scientific research is always “united” with traditional metaphysics.177 
Namely, both forms of inquiry maintain conceptions of reason and truth that are already 
limited by the field of investigation. 
§20 Representation and Objectification 
So far, I have discussed the mathematical basis of modern scientific research. In this 
section, I will discuss the relation between modern mathematical science and Cartesian 
metaphysics. As mentioned previously, Heidegger considers the metaphysical 
underpinning of modern science to be Descartes’ conception of truth as certainty, a 
notion he argues itself presupposes a metaphysical divide between object and subject.178 
According to Kisiel, Descartes’ Ego cogito is the ultimate expression of tà mathémata, 
since Descartes attempts to ground all knowledge in the ‘clear and distinct ideas’ of 
human thought.179 As Heidegger claims in AWV, it is in the metaphysics of Descartes 
that Being is first defined in terms of the ‘objectivity of representation’ and truth in 
terms of ‘certainty of representation’.180  
On this account, a thing can only truly ‘be’ a thing if it can be adequately certified as an 
object (res extensa) that is re-presented181 to the thinking subject (res cogitans). For 
Heidegger, to ‘re-present’ means to “bring what is present before one as something 
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confronting oneself.”182 That is, to consider something as an object opposed to and 
‘outside’ of oneself. This is the conception of truth and Being that is presupposed by the 
modern research experiment,183 which we saw sets the standard for how a thing can be 
‘certified’ on the basis of pre-set formal laws. In scientific research, one’s understanding 
of the thing is rendered in terms of how and to what extent the thing can be represented 
to the human subject. Subsequently, a thing only becomes ‘knowable’ as a thing when 
the calculating person can securely claim the object represented corresponds to the 
object itself.184  
Let us return to the example of sound, as I noted in §3, we never experience a sound. 
Instead, we immediately hear something as something meaningfully related to us. In the 
modern research experiment, however, we pass over this meaningful relation in favour 
of those objectively present characteristics that can be certified according to the 
mathematical blueprint we have projected. Pierre Duhem has pointed out that in 
scientific practice our own concrete instances of hearing are developed into abstract 
concepts like pitch, octave, timbre, et cetera. In the field of acoustics, we explain the 
relations between these abstractions by formulating experiments that are grounded in 
formal laws like those about motion discussed above.185 These laws limit our 
investigation to the most general characteristics of things, which are stripped of all 
particularity and thereby removed from the total meaningful context of our own factical 
situation.  
Accordingly, worldly things become recognisable only as objects that conform to the 
pre-established ground-plan. These objects, which are ‘represented’ to human 
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consciousness, are then submitted to research experiments that attempt to certify what 
the object ‘is’. The object is only certified as an object when it accords with pre-set, 
abstract concepts, like those I have just mentioned in regard to sound. Therefore, 
implicit in the practice of scientific research is a conception of the thing that places a 
demand on the thing to conform to some fixed representation, which is expressed in an 
abstract, formal law and reinforced by the research experiment. We thus overlook the 
world of human concern in favour of ‘nature’, an arrangement of objects to be 
ascertained and investigated. We skip over our being-in-the-world, which is always 
primary. 
In the same process, human being becomes a subjectum, insofar as our comportment 
toward worldly things changes, placing us at “the center to which the existent as such is 
related.”186 Namely, on this account, things can only be things when they stand over and 
against us in consciousness. The world becomes a thing separate from human being, 
that human beings have a ‘view of’.187 Hence, the notion of a ‘worldview’ is only 
possible after we have projected a scientific understanding upon our surrounding world. 
Once we have already reduced the Being of worldly things to those objectively present 
characteristics that conform to the laws we have constructed. The danger is that we do 
not recognise the historical basis and limitations of this understanding, leaving us prone 
to ignore the meaningful world that informs our everyday lives.  
§21 The Principle of Sufficient Reason 
In PR, Heidegger explains modern science from a different angle, in terms of Leibniz’s 
principle of sufficient reason. Jan Patočka—a student of Heidegger’s—identifies the 
principle of sufficient reason as the “central philosophical formulation” of traditional 
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metaphysics, which he argues Heidegger takes to be a principle of “universal 
calculability and predictability.”188 Heidegger himself describes the principle as “the 
fundamental principle of all fundamental principles”,189 which has come to rule human 
thought in the modern ‘atomic’ age.  
In the ‘short’ or ‘vulgar’ form, Leibniz’s principle reads: ‘nihil est sine ratione’, or 
‘nothing is without reason’.190 Heidegger writes that in our modern understanding, 
“what is encountered is presented to a cognising I, presented back to and over against it, 
made present”.191 Once again, he is suggesting that modern rationality presupposes an 
understanding of the human being as Cartesian subject. To repeat, on the Cartesian 
account, the human being is conceived of as a thing among things—specifically as a 
thinking thing. Yet, the human being is not a thing, since, unlike things, we always find 
ourselves being-in-the-world.192 Only human beings understand and interpret 
themselves and the things they encounter in terms of the historical surrounding world, 
which we can only ‘escape’ when we die. 
Returning to PR, Heidegger offers a number of different formulations of the principle of 
reason, which work to draw our attention to the various ways in which our thinking is 
already shaped by sufficient reason. In one such formulation—which Heidegger, 
following Leibniz himself, calls the “strict” form—the principle states: “nothing is 
without rendering its reasons”.193 Or, in John D. Caputo’s translation of the strict form: 
“for every truth, a reason can be given”.194 Of particular interest is that at a glance, there 
seems to be nothing especially controversial or provocative about this statement; to 
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some extent, this formulation seems self-evident, even a priori. We immediately 
understand the principle of reason without reflection, because reason has come to shape 
the very way things in the world are given to us. As Braver quips, under this principle 
“beings provoke investigation the way pies demand to be eaten, or chairs beckon us to 
take a load off”.195 In short, providing reasons has become incorporated into our very 
thinking and acting. As Heidegger puts it, the principle of reason is the “element within 
which [our] cognition moves, as does the fish in water and the bird in air”.196 
It is the apparent obviousness of the principle of reason that sparks Heidegger’s interest. 
According to Caputo, Heidegger’s intention in the opening pages of PR is to throw us 
into confusion about a principle that we otherwise take for granted.197 For Heidegger, 
sufficient reason is obvious to us because it “resounds” with human thinking as “the 
motive of its conduct”.198 The way the principle ‘resounds’ or shapes our actions within 
the world becomes increasingly clear if we listen more closely to the so-called ‘strict’ 
formulation. Heidegger observes that the strict formulation introduces the Latin reddere, 
which highlights the ‘demand-character’ of sufficient reason. He notes that reddere has 
its etymological roots in expressions like ‘to render’, or ‘to reckon.’199 Expressions that 
have a similar sense to expressions like ‘to arrange’ or ‘to order one thing after another.’ 
As Caputo points out, reddere can be translated literally as ‘to give back.’200 This raises 
the question: who is giving what back to whom?  
Heidegger’s answer is that it is the human ‘subject’ who must ‘give back’ to reason. It 
follows, then, that when Heidegger speaks of the ‘demand-character’ of reason, he is 
drawing our attention to a way of thinking which presupposes the Cartesian divide 
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between the thinking subject and the ‘natural’ world. With this thinking, there is a 
‘demand’ put on the human being to provide reasons for the things they see and do in 
the world. This demand shapes our everyday engagement with things to the extent that 
we attempt to explain this very engagement rationally. For the most part, we are quite 
able to provide some kind of reasons for our actions (faulty or ill-informed reasons are 
still reasons, after all). Often, we even attempt to provide sufficient reasons for the 
things we say and do. Right now, I am myself providing reasons to you—the reader—in 
order to outline some of the limitations of reason itself! 
Overall, one would be hard pressed to overstate the influence of reason on human 
thinking in the modern era. Yet, historically speaking, this is not the only way that 
human beings have experienced themselves in relation to the rest of the world. One of 
the key observations Heidegger makes in PR is that we are only able to ‘render’ or give 
back reasons for the things surrounding us once we have already assumed the role of 
‘subject’. Once we already consider things as objects that are opposed to us and separate 
from our everyday involvement with them. Only after adopting this theoretical attitude 
can we ‘give back’ to reason by putting forward propositions about the way such 
objects are ‘represented’ to us.  
These propositions are given as reasons, and are deemed ‘sufficient’ when they 
correspond to the objectively present character of things. In the age of modern science, 
the objectively present is generally expressed in terms of the mathematical, formalised 
properties of a thing. Those properties that are ‘already known’ according to the 
methods of natural science, and which are able to be tested and verified according to 
formal laws like those described above. Thus, in our modern understanding, when 
presented with the question ‘what is the thingness of the thing?’, our response will 
typically refer to those mathematical, formal properties that are objectively present, 
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since this is the ‘demand’ imposed on us by the principle of reason. In short, science 
does not deal with the things we deal with in everyday life, but only with things reduced 
to the most abstract, general properties. All characteristics that are considered 
changeable are replaced with formal characteristics that are considered unchangeable.  
Our contemporary society is replete with examples of this type of formalisation. In 
regard to the arts, Tallis has pointed out some of the shortcomings in recent attempts by 
neuroscientists to reduce our appreciation of music to the objectively present brain-
states of the individual, which are able to be scanned and analysed.201 In politics, 
Jacques Rancière has observed a shift in our contemporary understanding of democracy: 
rather than the polis of Ancient Greece, we now have opinion polls that are able to be 
rendered mathematically.202 Furthermore, one could consider the utilitarian ethics of 
Peter Singer, whose moral philosophy is founded on ahistorical ethical principles that 
are taken to be self-evident and universal.203 Such examples, among countless others, 
are illustrative of a total shift in our historical understanding of what is, which becomes 
reduced to objective presence. A shift that Heidegger traces to the so-called ‘demand’ of 
sufficient reasoning.  
§22 The Rose is Without ‘Why?’ 
The problem with this way of thinking is that we tend to forget that the demand of 
sufficient reason can only make sense to us because of our own historical situation. 
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Hence, this type of reasoning will always fall short when it comes to the question of 
Being. As I noted at the very outset, the question of Being can be expressed as the 
question ‘what is a thing?’, which again, is not a question about this or that thing, but a 
question about what it means to be a thing. However, when we respond to the demand 
placed on us by the principle of reason, we pass over the meaningful presence of things 
and limit ourselves to that which is objectively present. The consequence of this is that 
we limit our inquiry to the most abstract, unchanging characteristics of singular things, 
which does not tell us anything about the thingness of the thing itself, which is 
constituted historically. In short, how exactly are we able to ‘verify’ our understanding 
of the thing on the basis of such timeless, unchanging characteristics, when this 
understanding will change depending on the way beings are disclosed historically? 
It is in consideration of these tacit, ontological assumptions and the problems arising 
from them that Heidegger offers yet another formulation of the principle, this time to 
bring the principle into closer proximity with a verse from the mystic poet Angelus 
Silesius—and, as we will see, in closer alignment with the question of Being more 
generally. Under this formulation, the principle runs: “nothing is without a why”.204 
Almost immediately, Heidegger refers us to following verse from Silesius’ Cherubinic 
Wanderer: Sensual Description of the Four Final Things (1657): 
The rose is without why: it blooms because it blooms, 
It pays no attention to itself, asks whether it is seen.205 
From the position of our modern rational–scientific understanding, this may seem like 
quite a perplexing turn. However, as Caputo observes—and as we would do well to 
remember—Heidegger does not introduce the words of the mystic poet out of some 
disregard for the basic laws of logic, but because he finds the poet’s words 
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“astoundingly clear” and “neatly constructed”.206 After all, today, if someone were to 
ask us “why does the rose bloom?” we might direct them to the botanist, who would no 
doubt have quite a bit to tell us about the ‘APETALA1’ gene, and the way this 
particular gene triggers the “floral initiation” of the rose by “integrating growth, 
patterning, and hormonal pathways”.207 While such discoveries are undeniably 
impressive, these are far from the kind of answers that Heidegger is looking for—what 
can the ‘APETALA1’ gene tell us about the meaningful presence of the rose?  
Heidegger turns to Silesius’ verse because the verse offers us an insight into the 
thingness of the thing that is otherwise occluded by our modern notion of reason. In 
order to draw out such an insight, Heidegger distinguishes between the ‘why’ and the 
‘because’. To start with the latter, he notes that the ‘because’ does not seek grounds, but 
conveys grounds.208 The ‘because’ immediately suggests to us what kind of answer is 
required, which we can see when we pose the question ‘why does the rose bloom?’ to 
the botanist, who can readily provide us with a ‘because’ that accords with the demands 
of reason. The ‘why’, on the other hand, refers to the style of ontological questioning 
mentioned above, in that the ‘why’ seeks out precisely those grounds which are 
presupposed by the ‘because’.  
§23 Being as Abyss 
The key difference, then, is in this relationship to the question of ground [grund], and 
how we conceive of the ground that ‘grounds’ our understanding of what is.209 By 
making this distinction between ‘why’ and ‘because’, Heidegger aims to show us that 
reason and ground are not equivalent, and it is in fact Being and ground that “belong 
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together”.210 In Caputo’s words, Heidegger is not suggesting that Being ‘has’ a ground 
but that Being ‘is’ ground.211 If we take ‘grounds’ to refer to the structures that underlie 
the meaningfulness of things, then to ask after the ground of the thing is to ask after the 
‘thingness’ of the thing, i.e., the Being of the thing. 
In light of this, we can see that when posed the question, ‘why does the rose bloom?’ 
the botanist does not ask after the ground of the rose, but considers the rose only in 
terms of it being an object that appears, and which is in need of an explanation. In doing 
so, the botanist unwittingly presupposes reason as the ground of the thing. In other 
words, the botanist’s answer conflates the Being or meaningfulness of the rose with 
what is measurable and objectively present (e.g., genes, “hormonal pathways” etc.)—
with what is ‘already known’ and certifiable through research. While the botanist’s 
answer might be an adequate response in terms of the ‘because’, this response does not 
hold in terms of the ‘why’. The botanist has not told us anything about the grounds of 
the rose because this ground is simply assumed. 
If we glance back to Silesius’ verse, we can see that he does not at all deny that the rose 
can be understood in terms of the ‘because’ (and how could he, when our friend the 
botanist can so readily produce an answer?). Rather, the poet asserts that the rose is 
without why, which is different from the claim that the rose is without ground. As 
human beings, we can convey grounds for the rose, but unlike us, the rose itself is not 
driven by the need to seek out grounds. Only human beings can formulate reasons and 
attribute some kind of ‘because’ to the rose, the rose itself has no need for these reasons; 
it is, so to speak, without why, but never without meaning or ground for us. 
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Heidegger refers us to the poet’s verse to remind us that reason is not itself a being to be 
encountered in the world, but a historically grounded understanding of what Being 
discloses, which has come to frame our modern interpretation of that which is.212 We 
can see this insofar as the demand of sufficient reason is placed on us—the human 
being—and not the rose. The rose cannot ask after those genetic or hormonal factors 
which trigger its so-called ‘floral initiation’. It is simply not a part of being the rose to 
ask ‘why?’ or to consider itself at all.213 For Heidegger, asking ‘why?’ is a profoundly 
human activity. The search for meaningful grounds is always shaped by a broader 
historical horizon, and only human beings are able to understand and interpret the things 
surrounding them in terms of this horizon. The rose, on the other hand, has no ‘access’ 
to this horizon, no use for grounds. The search for grounds, expressed by the ‘why’, 
only has meaning for historical human beings.  
We see this in Silesius’ verse, insofar as the Being of the rose is ‘without why’ and thus 
outside the demand of reason. The rose simply blooms because it blooms. While we can 
give the rose a ground by providing reasons for it, the rose itself is not grounded in 
anything to do with reason. As a principle, the principle of reason is groundless to the 
extent that we cannot give reasons or grounds for the principle itself. There is no reason 
to assume that what is can be rendered in terms of sufficient reasoning. Especially given 
that things must ‘be’ before we can give reasons for them. Accordingly, the principle 
falls short in regard to the question of Being, since sufficient reasoning can only apply 
to beings, and not Being qua Being.214 To repeat, the Being of things ‘is not’ a thing, 
certainly not anything objectively present that is represented to a thinking subject. Only 
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beings can be grounded in this way, the ground itself—Being—will be disclosed 
differently according to one’s human understanding, which is always historical.  
As that which is not present but which gives presence to the things we encounter, Being 
has no ground, no first cause. Heidegger notes: “to the extent that Being as such 
grounds, it remains groundless”.215 Being is ‘abysmal’; both ground and abyss 
[Abgrund].216. Hence, as ground, Being is ‘groundless’: Being discloses beings, yet 
cannot be reduced to or rendered in terms of what is disclosed. In this way, when we 
provide rational scientific accounts of the earthly beings we encounter, we offer an 
interpretation of what is that is already grounded in the tradition of thinking. According 
to Heidegger, if we do not make this historical framing of beings clear to ourselves, then 
we risk merely carrying on the tradition, thereby limiting ourselves to one particular 
understanding of what is. As he warns us in a lecture toward the end of his career: 
The attempt to think Being without beings becomes necessary because 
otherwise, it seems to me, there is no longer any possibility of explicitly 
bringing into view the Being of what is today all over the earth, let alone of 
adequately determining the relation of man to what has been called “Being” 
up to now.217 
To address one possible objection, we should note that Heidegger is not merely 
suggesting that human beings think, whereas roses do not. To take him as pointing out 
such a truism would be to tacitly assume the very notion of reason he wants to keep at 
bay. Rather, through the words of Silesius, Heidegger argues for the necessity of a leap; 
that is, a leap out of the ‘mighty orbit’ of reason, and, by extension, the metaphysical 
gulf assumed by Cartesianism.218 If the principle of reason has come to serve as the very 
basis of metaphysics, the ground from which we understand the ‘thingness’ of the thing, 
then the poet’s verse can serve as an alternative to this metaphysical understanding. 
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The mystic poet opens up a space for us to consider the thing in a new light, one 
unclouded by our modern notion of reason. Caputo remarks, quite aptly, that “[Silesius] 
speaks of the rose not as it stands for the representing subject but as it stands in 
itself”.219 That is to say, the poet offers an account of the rose which is not dependent on 
our taking up the role of Cartesian subject. The value of Silesius’ verse, then, is that 
Silesius does not presuppose reason as the ground of the rose. This, in turn, highlights 
the problem with presupposing reason as the ground of beings. For Silesius, the rose 
simply stands on its own, and not on the grounds that we provide for it. Silesius does not 
say anything of how worldly things are given, just that they are given, thereby affirming 
the groundless abyss of Being—which, like the rose is, ‘without why’.  
§24 Conclusion 
Returning to our broader discussion, in chapter one, I outlined Heidegger’s concern for 
the question of Being, which he attempts to revive via the hermeneutic analysis of 
human existence. Following this, in chapter two, I discussed Heidegger’s conception of 
the structure of human existence or ‘Dasein’. I noted how, as Dasein, we always 
understand ourselves and the things around us in terms of the projects we undertake, 
and how by virtue of these projects, we are always ‘there’ as being-in-the-world. In this 
chapter, I have focused specifically on two of Heidegger’s texts after BT, in order to 
show how he extends his earlier critique of the metaphysical tradition to concentrate 
specifically on the way that modern science is defined by sufficient reasoning. In doing 
so, I have limited our discussion to the scientific conception of the natural world, as 
defined by sufficient reasoning, to outline some of the specific ways in which this 
conception leads us to overlook our everyday living in favour of universal laws that are 
‘already known’. 
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As I have argued, this way of thinking is illustrative of a ‘demand’ placed on human 
beings to offer grounds for the things around them. Yet, these ‘grounds’ are an 
interpretation that we have inherited from the tradition of thinking, an interpretation 
which betrays ontological prejudices that stem from a particular historical situation. 
Without the transformation of tà mathemata into modern mathematics, taken as 
applicable to all beings—including human beings—modern science would not be 
possible. Hence, far from ‘already known’, mathematical–scientific laws are always 
historically constituted, and only have importance or relevance to human beings. For 
Heidegger, we are prone to overlook the historical basis of this understanding, which 
has been ushered in by modern science. He warns us against limiting ourselves to the 
mathematical–scientific account, and the example of Silesius brings this warning to the 
fore. We must be careful not to forget that the demand of reason and the seeking of 




In the above, I have discussed the historical basis and limitations of sufficient 
‘scientific’ reasoning, which I claim is an interpretation that is derived from the 
meaningful world of human beings, which is always primary. To give a brief overview, 
in the first chapter I concentrated on Heidegger’s conception of meaning. Specifically, I 
introduced Heidegger’s concern for fundamental ontological questions, which I framed 
in terms of our meaningful engagement with worldly things. This is supported by recent 
work by Sheehan, who has argued for a ‘paradigm shift’ in Heideggerian research. As 
noted, for Sheehan, ‘Being’ should be taken to refer to the meaningful presence of 
things to human beings. Following this line of argument, against traditional metaphysics 
and modern science, I have argued that the particular way things are meaningfully 
present for human beings will change historically. The way the world makes sense to us 
will always depend on the particular circumstances of our own lives, and so cannot be 
rendered in terms of fixed objects that are represented to the human subject in their 
timeless presence.  
In chapter two, I focused specifically on the meaningful world of human beings. I 
considered Heidegger’s notion of Dasein and the Cartesian distinction between res 
extensa and res cogitans. Following Heidegger, I observed that Dasein’s most basic 
relation to the surrounding world is ‘being-in-the-world’, which is illustrated by the way 
that we always find ourselves using tools that are handy to the projects we undertake. 
The projects we undertake are structured by care, and through our taking care for the 
things we do, our surroundings are always meaningful or ‘open’ to us. We do not 
primarily find ourselves as subjects who are opposed to singular objects that stand over 
and against us. Rather, as ek-sistent, Dasein is structured to ‘stand outside’ itself and 
toward the openness of Being. At the same time, as in-sistent, Dasein is finite, and can 
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only encounter particular beings. Put together, we always find ourselves inextricably 
immersed by our surroundings, but not reducible to them. 
Finally, in chapter three, I discussed AWV and PR, in order to detail some of the specific 
ways that scientific reasoning has covered over this meaningful surrounding world. 
Moreover, to further consider the historical basis of scientific reason, I showed that in 
these two works, Heidegger extends the critique of Cartesianism he initially put forward 
in BT. For Heidegger, modern scientific reasoning is grounded in Cartesian 
metaphysics, which is itself an appropriation of the Ancient Greek conception of tà 
mathémata. While Heidegger approaches the problem differently in each of these 
works, he maintains that our modern understanding of the surrounding world is already 
shaped by Cartesian metaphysics, which limits our understanding of all that ‘is’ to what 
is unchanging and objectively present. In doing so, we limit our focus to the objectively 
present, static character of things, leaving us unable to account for the meaningful 
presence of things, which is always disclosed historically. For this reason, we cannot 
render Being qua Being in terms of some unchanging, universalisable ground. The 
ground that grounds our understanding of what is will be different depending on the 
historical horizon that structures everyday human existence.  
In closing, we can say that ultimately, the world around us is like the rose, without why. 
As noted, the world ‘is not’ any kind of being that we can encounter: the world worlds 
insofar as the world ‘is’ the historically constituted, meaningful context of human 
concern, which therefore cannot be rendered in terms of any kind of timeless a priori 
concepts or principles. As we have seen throughout, what Being discloses will change 
depending on the historical epoch that we find ourselves; contrary to our modern 
rational understanding, there is no ‘timeless’ or eternal grounds from which we can 
explain the thingness of the thing. Therefore, as a method, the value of hermeneutic 
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phenomenology is that it offers us the possibility to question the historical conditions 
that give rise to our interpretations of what is. From this, we can attempt to re-think our 
own interpretation of what Being discloses. To ‘leap beyond’ the confines of our own 
understanding and, instead, approach beings as the beings they ‘are’. This is not to 
reject, or even to undermine the rational–scientific worldview, but rather to focus our 
attention back on the world around us, which is always meaningful and that we only 
‘escape’ when we die.  The light that illuminates will be always be reflected in the 
things around us, albeit differently depending on when and who we are. If we wish to 
account for the meaningfulness of things, then we must be careful not to lose sight of 
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